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ABSTRACT 
In striking the ban on same-sex marriage in Obergefell v. Hodges, the Supreme Court avoided tiers of 
scrutiny, thus declining to apply rational basis in a non-deferential manner as it had in other cases involving 
sexual orientation.  After signaling its growing discomfort with the deferential Grutter v. Bollinger strict 
scrutiny formulation in the Fisher I remand and the Fisher II oral argument, the Fisher v. University of 
Texas (Fisher II) majority embraced that very analysis to sustain the Texas affirmative action program.  And 
although the Court claims to apply intermediate scrutiny in gender-based equal protection cases, the cases devolve 
to de facto applications of strict scrutiny or rational basis, based on whether the Court claims a real-sex 
difference or an overbroad gender-based generalization. 
The tiers-of-scrutiny doctrine has evolved from two to three formal tiers, yet a closer reading suggests five applied 
tiers.  As a basis for prediction, the tiers are inverted, producing the following counterintuitive sequence: strict 
scrutiny, rational basis plus, intermediate scrutiny, strict scrutiny lite, and rational basis.  The result has been 
doctrinal confusion, a lack of predictability, and pleas for abandonment or fundamental reform.  
This Article’s theoretical account explains why tiers of scrutiny should not be jettisoned and why the existing 
scheme, as applied to race, sexual orientation, and gender, has produced anomalous—perhaps even 
disingenuous—applications.  It further demonstrates how a modest reconceptualization operating within the 
general framework of existing tiers can greatly simplify applications, avoid the most critical anomalies, and 
thereby improve doctrinal predictability and coherence. 
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INTRODUCTION 
Following oral arguments in Obergefell v. Hodges,1 the dominant media 
account was that Justice Ruth Bader Ginsburg had eviscerated arguments 
against same-sex marriage.  Observers claimed that Justice Ginsburg had 
established the absence of plausible arguments that same-sex marriage 
would undermine opposite-sex marriage, would other than benefit children 
raised by committed same-sex partners, or would otherwise compromise 
social mores.2  Although Justice Kennedy began his questioning with a 
seemingly ahistorical claim that our current definition of marriage, limited 
to monogamous opposite-sex unions, had persisted for the ages,3 he soon 
reclaimed his earlier voice, linking respect for same-sex unions to the digni-
ty of committed partners.4  The general impression was a fait accompli in 
which a majority would dismiss same-sex marriage bans with comparable 
dispatch to that given anti-miscegenation laws in the landmark 1967 deci-
sion, Loving v. Virginia.5 
While this account provided same-sex marriage proponents grounds to 
celebrate, a nagging doubt persisted.  Before oral argument, Obergefell’s domi-
nant framing sounded in equal protection: were same-sex partners denied ac-
cess to marriage victims of a constitutionally prohibited distinction?  In this 
framing, the issue was not the merits of same-sex marriage bans; rather, it was 
how to classify persons denied access to marriage due to sexual orientation 
and how to assess same-sex marriage bans based on the selected classification. 
The elephant in the room—the chosen tier of scrutiny—was largely ig-
nored in oral argument and was further AWOL6 in media commentary.  
On the issue of tiers, Justice Anthony Kennedy, whose vote, most predict-
 
 1 135 S. Ct. 2584 (2015). 
 2 Scott Lemieux, Same-Sex Marriage Opponents Sounded Desperate in Court. They Should Be, THE GUARDIAN 
(Apr. 28, 2015), http://www.theguardian.com/commentisfree/2015/apr/28/same-sex-marriage-
opponents-desperate-supreme-court; Inae Oh, Ruth Bader Ginsburg Shuts Down Gay-Marriage Challengers, 
MOTHER JONES (Apr. 29, 2015), http://www.motherjones.com/mojo/2015/04/ruth-bader-
ginsburg-shuts-down-gay-marriage-challengers (focusing on questioning by Justice Ginsburg and in-
cluding discussion of other Justices). 
 3 Transcript of Question 1 Oral Argument at 6–7, Obergefell v. Hodges, 135 S. Ct. 2584 (2015) 
(No. 14–556) (“This definition has been with us for millennia.”); see also Obergefell, 135 S. Ct. at 
2594 (“The centrality of marriage to the human condition makes it unsurprising that the institu-
tion has existed for millennia and across civilizations.”).  But see id. at 2595 (“The history of mar-
riage is one of both continuity and change.  That institution—even as confined to opposite-sex 
relations—has evolved over time.”); id. at 2621 (Roberts, C.J., dissenting) (“Indeed, from the 
standpoint of history and tradition, a leap from opposite-sex marriage to same-sex marriage is 
much greater than one from a two-person union to plural unions, which have deep roots in some 
cultures around the world.”).  For a more detailed analysis of Obergefell, see infra Part III.C. 
 4 See Transcript of Question 1 Oral Argument, supra note 3, at 72–73; see also U.S. v. Windsor, 133 
S. Ct. 2675, 2692 (2013) (discussing the dignity of marriage). 
 5 388 U.S. 1 (1967).  The story behind the case is now told in a feature length motion picture.  See 
LOVING (Raindog Films & Big Beach Films 2016). 
 6 Absent without Leave. 
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ed, would control the case outcome, appeared to have squeezed himself in-
to a doctrinal box.7  The choice of tier often controls the fate of equal pro-
tection claims.  Even when it does not, it influences how the analysis is 
framed.8  For Justice Kennedy, the problem seemed less about the outcome 
than the framing.  Although he seemed likely to vote against the constitu-
tionality of same-sex marriage bans, the challenge was avoiding casting as-
persions on those who embraced a more traditional view of marriage. 
The traditional framing of tiers was binary: rational basis review or 
strict scrutiny.  Those who identified a suspect class or fundamental right 
received the benefit of strict scrutiny, which was almost invariably fatal for 
the challenged law.  Those who did not were left with rational basis review, 
the default tier, which typically sustained the challenged law.  The relatively 
more recent third tier, intermediate scrutiny, although harder to predict, 
was largely limited to gender-based distinctions.9 
Even the three-tier scheme is misleading.  A closer inspection suggests five 
categories that can be expressed in a linear sequence.  The left-most position 
corresponds to the greatest likelihood of sustaining the challenged law, 
whereas the right-most position corresponds to the greatest likelihood of hav-
ing the challenged law struck down.  Immediately to the right of the relaxed 
rational basis test is its somewhat more demanding form, “rational basis plus” 
or “with teeth.”  Immediately to the left of the stringent strict scrutiny test is 
its correspondingly more lenient form, “strict scrutiny lite.”  Intermediate 
scrutiny falls between the two modified tests, producing the following scheme: 
 
 7 In the aftermath of Donald Trump’s presidential victory, it is no longer certain that Justice Ken-
nedy will remain the median jurist.  Neil Gorsuch has been confirmed to replace Justice Antonin 
Scalia, and his appointment is not expected to affect the overall composition of the Court from 
an ideological perspective.  Lisa Marshall Manheim, Opinion, The Gorsuch Fight Changed the Senate. 
Will It Change the Court?, N.Y. TIMES (Apr. 8, 2017), https://www.nytimes.com/2017/04/08/-
opinion/the-gorsuch-fight-changed-the-senate-will-it-change-the-court.html?_r=0.  An appoint-
ment that would replace one of the more senior remaining jurists, however, could have the effect 
of changing that composition in a more predictably conservative direction.  Peter Baker, Picking 
One Justice, Trump Has Eye on Choosing a Second, N.Y. TIMES, Jan. 31, 2017, 
https://www.nytimes.com/2017/01/31/us/politics/trump-supreme-court-neil-gorsuch.html 
(explaining that Justice Kennedy is “the swing vote who holds the balance of power on the court” 
and discussing the significant impact President Trump could have on the direction of the Su-
preme Court if a second seat were to open if Justice Kennedy were to retire); LEE EPSTEIN ET 
AL., PRESIDENT-ELECT TRUMP AND HIS POSSIBLE JUSTICES (2016), available at 
http://epstein.wustl.edu/research/PossibleTrumpJustices.pdf (considering how President 
Trump’s possible future nominees could shape the Supreme Court). 
 8 For an analysis of the Court’s often creative workarounds the tiers of scrutiny, see infra Part I.C. 
 9  For a more in-depth explanation of the development of the tiers of scrutiny, see infra Part I.  
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TABLE 1 
TIERS OF SCRUTINY IN ONE DIMENSION 
(1) Rational  
 Basis 





(5) Strict  
 Scrutiny 
Lax Review                                                                                  Stringent Review 
 
Although this scheme tracks black letter law, with “rational basis plus,” 
a somewhat more demanding form of rational basis review, and “strict 
scrutiny lite,” a somewhat less stringent form of strict scrutiny, it is far less 
helpful in predicting case outcomes.10  When the Supreme Court employs 
rational basis plus, it typically strikes down the challenged law, and when it 
employs strict scrutiny lite, it typically sustains the challenged law.  The 
anomalies involve two categories.  The first is race-based affirmative action, 
where despite applying strict scrutiny, the Court sustains the challenged 
law.  The second involves animus against politically unpopular groups, 
where despite applying rational basis, the Court strikes down the chal-
lenged law.  From a predictive perspective, therefore, the tiers have been 
inverted, with strict scrutiny lite abutting rational basis and with both of 
those tests sustaining challenged laws, and with rational basis plus abutting 
strict scrutiny and with both of those tests striking challenged laws.  The 
anomalous sequence, 14325, is presented in Table 2: 
TABLE 2 
TIERS OF SCRUTINY RECAST 





(2) Rational  
Basis Plus 
(5) Strict  
 Scrutiny 
More Likely to Sustain                                                        More Likely to Strike 
 
Affirmative action falls within Category 4.11  Given his past treatment of 
cases implicating sexual minorities, some commentators anticipated that 
Justice Kennedy would place same-sex marriage into Category 2, although 
others argued for Category 3.12  Justice Kennedy took neither of these ap-
proaches and instead largely jettisoned equal protection analysis in favor of 
 
 10 For a detailed presentation of the relevant cases, see infra Part I.C., and cites therein. 
 11 See infra Part I.C.1. 
 12 See infra Part III.C. 
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an alternative due process approach.13  This Article will explain this im-
portant doctrinal move, as part of a broader inquiry into the tiers of scruti-
ny framework.  The analysis will also explain how the tiers doctrine has 
created anomalies associated with affirmative action, same-sex marriage, 
and gender-based classifications, and how the Court could simplify its ap-
plications without abandoning the essential doctrinal framework. 
The analytical difficulty that generates this peculiar doctrinal progres-
sion involves dimensionality.  Dimensions are normative scales of meas-
urement used to evaluate virtually anything that is being compared.  Di-
mensionality studies normative measures and how they interrelate.  People 
routinely evaluate information along analytical dimensions.  Some dimen-
sions involve simple binaries—black versus white, male versus female—
although as used to sort individuals, such simple schemes sometimes fail.14  
Other scales are more nuanced, for example, continuous gradations of 
height or weight.  People often combine multiple criteria along a single di-
mension.  Larger objects tend to be heavier, allowing us to rank modes of 
transportation—a scooter, a bicycle, a car—in a sequence that captures 
both size and weight.  Sometimes combined alignments break down.  Add-
ing a hot air balloon—larger than a car yet lighter than a scooter—forces 
the need to split the dimensions of size (scooter, bicycle, car, then hot air bal-
loon) and weight (hot air balloon then scooter, bicycle, car).15 
Equal protection implicates important constitutional values that can also 
be cast along analytical dimensions.  These include degrees of invidiousness 
of challenged classifications or the relative importance of claimed fundamen-
tal rights.  These evaluative criteria often align neatly with a simple analytical 
dimension captured by tiers of scrutiny.  Some cases, however, like inflated 
hot air balloons, disrupt our assumptions about common measurement 
scales.  The problem with the tiers of scrutiny scheme is not the absolute 
number of tiers.  With relatively minor adjustments, the formal three-tier 
scheme works well.  Rather, the difficulty is failing to appreciate how the tiers 
implicate the dimensionality of the laws subject to constitutional challenge. 
This Article simplifies the tiers analysis and explains why affirmative action 
and same-sex marriage are constitutional hot air balloons.  The analysis estab-
lishes three main points about tiers of scrutiny.  First, for historical reasons,16 
equal protection cases involving race implicate two dimensions, thereby also 
 
 13  Id. 
 14 See, e.g., Julie Scelfo, A University Recognizes a Third Gender: Neutral, N.Y. TIMES, Feb. 3, 2015, 
http://www.nytimes.com/2015/02/08/education/edlife/a-university-recognizes-a-third-
gender-neutral.html?_r=0 (discussing university response to student who identifies with neither 
conventional gender and who favors the neutral pronoun, “they”). 
 15 The rankings assume the hot air balloon is aloft.  For an introduction of dimensionality and relat-
ed concepts, see Part II, and cites therein. 
 16 See infra Part II.E. 
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implicating a third tier of scrutiny or forcing a counterintuitive application of 
strict scrutiny if such laws are sustained.  Second, although the Supreme Court 
applies intermediate scrutiny to gender classifications, the cases implicate a 
single dimension, thus allowing for a simpler two-tier scheme.  Third, the 
Obergefell Court’s reliance on due process as the principal basis for striking 
same-sex marriage bans, coupled with its avoidance of tiers of scrutiny analy-
sis, reflects a failure to appreciate the case’s underlying dimensionality. 
This Article proceeds as follows.  Part I provides an overview of tiers of 
scrutiny.  In reviewing the existing scheme, this Part considers the doctrinal 
anomalies and various alternatives suggested by jurists and scholars.  Part II 
presents the dimensionality framework.  That Part demonstrates how the 
traditional two-tier system properly handles an infinite array of classifications 
assessed along a single dimension, and conversely, how as small a sampling as 
three cases can implicate multiple dimensions, thereby thwarting a two-tier 
scheme.  Part III relates this analysis to equal protection cases involving race, 
gender, and sexual orientation.  The analysis demonstrates how dimensional-
ity explains the inversion of tiers, and it explains how to simplify outcomes 
while also improving our understanding of the case law.  The Article con-
cludes with a cheat sheet to help translate the Supreme Court’s often mis-
leading claims about its choice of tiers into the tiers it actually applies. 
I.  THE PROBLEM OF TIERS 
To assess the sometimes confusing state of the tiers of scrutiny doctrine, 
we first review the functions that the scheme serves. 
A.  Those Who Dichotomize . . . and Those Who Don’t17 
Professor Michael Klarman has identified McLaughlin v. Florida,18 involv-
ing a ban on interracial cohabitation, as the first Supreme Court case ap-
plying strict scrutiny to strike down an invidious race-based classification.19  
The conventional understanding is clear: strict scrutiny is almost always fa-
tal to adverse racial classifications.  More recently, the Court has applied 
this test to laws intended to benefit African Americans.  With notable ex-
ceptions that include Grutter v. Bollinger,20 which sustained the University of 
 
 17 Although often expressed as, “There are two kinds of people in the world, those who dichotomize 
and those who don’t,” the actual quotation is: “There may be said to be two classes of people in 
the world; those who constantly divide the people of the world into two classes, and those who do 
not.”  ROBERT C. BENCHLEY, The Most Popular Book of the Month, in OF ALL THINGS 187 (1921). 
 18 379 U.S. 184, 196 (1964). 
 19 See Michael Klarman, An Interpretive History of Modern Equal Protection, 90 MICH. L. REV. 213, 255 
(1991).  The Supreme Court planted the seed for two levels of scrutiny arguably as early as The 
Slaughter-House Cases, 83 U.S. (16 Wall) 36, 81 (1873), which distinguished claims arising under the 
Fourteenth Amendment based on race from those implicating other, purely economic, interests. 
 20 539 U.S. 306, 343–44 (2003). 
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Michigan Law School affirmative action program, and Fisher v. University of 
Texas (Fisher II),21 which sustained the University of Texas affirmative ac-
tion program, the result has generally been to strike such racial preferences 
down.22  As a doctrinal matter, lower federal courts are expected to subject 
all express racial classifications, whether intended to harm or to help Afri-
can Americans, to the two-part strict scrutiny test under which they are 
presumed invalid. 
Strict scrutiny demands that the government prove that the chosen clas-
sification serves a compelling governmental interest and that the selected 
means are narrowly tailored to further that interest.23  The two critical fea-
tures of this test are, first, that the burden is placed on the government once 
the claimant identifies the trigger for strict scrutiny, and second, that the 
test can be overcome if two conditions—a compelling governmental inter-
est and narrow tailoring—are satisfied. In conventional tiers of scrutiny 
analysis, strict scrutiny is the exception; rational basis is the rule.  To apply 
strict scrutiny, and thus to place the burden on the state to defend its laws, 
the challenger must put forth a specific justification.  Typically, the justifica-
tory trigger takes the form of an illicit classification, with race serving as the 
paradigmatic example,24 or a fundamental right, for example, the right to 
use contraceptives,25 or to terminate an unwanted pregnancy, at least prior 
to viability.26  Absent such a trigger, the presumptive, or baseline, level of 
 
 21 136 S. Ct. 2198, 2207 (2016). 
 22 This was, for example, true of Gratz v. Bollinger, 539 U.S. 244, 251 (2003).  For a discussion of cas-
es treating race-based preferences under intermediate scrutiny, see Part I.C.1.  Exceptions to this 
rule have been overturned, see Part I.C.1, or, in the case of Regents of the University of California v. 
Bakke, 438 U.S. 265, 271 (1978), largely incorporated into Grutter, 539 U.S. 306 (2003).  For a dis-
cussion of the case sequence leading to Fisher II, see Part II.F.2.a. 
 23 See, e.g., Adarand Constructors, Inc. v. Pena, 515 U.S. 200, 227 (1995) (“[Suspect] classifications 
are constitutional only if they are narrowly tailored measures that further compelling governmen-
tal interests.”). 
 24 See Graham v. Richardson, 403 U.S. 365, 372 (1971) (“[C]lassifications based on alienage, like 
those based on nationality or race, are inherently suspect and subject to close judicial scrutiny.”) 
(citations omitted). 
 25 Eisenstadt v. Baird, 405 U.S. 438, 453 (1972) (finding that married and unmarried couples must 
have the same right to use contraceptives); Griswold v. Connecticut, 381 U.S. 479, 485 (1965) 
(holding that a law that outright prohibits, rather than regulates, the use of contraceptives was 
unconstitutional). 
 26 Roe v. Wade, 410 U.S. 113 (1973).  In Planned Parenthood of Southeastern Pennsylvania v. Casey, 505 
U.S. 833 (1992), the Supreme Court downgraded abortion from a fundamental right to a liberty 
interest, and in Gonzales v. Carhart, 550 U.S. 124 (2007), it sustained a late-term, partial-birth 
abortion ban that did not include a maternal-health exception.  In Whole Woman’s Health v. Heller-
stedt, 136 S. Ct. 2292 (2016), the Supreme Court applied a more stringent version of the undue 
burden test to strike down two provisions of a Texas law that limited access to abortions by re-
quiring physician-admitting privileges at local hospitals and by restricting abortions to facilities 
upgraded to match those of a surgical center, the combined effect of which placed women of re-
productive age, in many instances, several hundred miles away from the nearest abortion facility.  
These cases exemplify drawing a line along the dimension of weak-to-strong abortion rights, sep-
arating procedures, or access to facilities, that are or are not protected.  See infra Part III. 
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scrutiny—rational basis—applies. 
Unlike strict scrutiny, rational basis leaves the burden of proof on the 
challenger, who, to have a law struck down, must demonstrate the absence 
of a legitimate governmental interest or of means that rationally further that 
interest.27  Under traditional rational basis review, or the straight-face test, 
nearly any purpose counts as legitimate provided that one can articulate it 
without physically belying sincerity.  As demonstrated below, this is no 
longer literally true,28 although it is most obviously so in the Court’s unerr-
ing acceptance of creative defenses to special interest legislation masquer-
aded as furthering the public interest.29 
The basic two-tiered scheme—strict scrutiny and rational basis scruti-
ny—is most easily understood as operating in two sequential stages.  Imag-
ine two bins atop an otherwise empty desk, one marked “presumptively bad 
laws” and the other marked “presumptively good laws.”  Stage one is the 
initial rough sort, meaning the placement of cases into their respective bins.  
When a justificatory trigger is present, place the case in the bin marked pre-
sumptively bad laws.  This means that strict scrutiny applies and that the 
challenged law is far more likely than not to be struck down.  Alternatively, 
absent a justificatory trigger, place the case in the bin marked presumptive-
ly good laws.  This means that rational basis scrutiny applies and that the 
challenged law is far more likely than not to be sustained. 
Although preliminary, stage one is profoundly important.  Many consti-
tutional cases involve disputed factual characterizations that produce a kind 
of analytical gray zone.  When this occurs, whoever bears the burden of 
proof—the state trying to defend its law against strict scrutiny or the chal-
lenger trying to invalidate a law under rational basis review—will lose, ren-
dering the initial sort decisive. 
To illustrate, imagine that a state legislature reapportions its congressional 
districts following a decennial census.  The legislators know that doing so will 
affect the racial composition of its districts, for example concentrating Afri-
can-American voters within minority-majority districts or, conversely, dis-
persing them across multiple majority-white districts, thus risking defeat of a 
 
 27 See, e.g., Nordlinger v. Hahn, 505 U.S. 1, 10 (1992) (“[U]nless . . . it jeopardizes exercise of a fun-
damental right or categorizes on the basis of an inherently suspect characteristic, the Equal Pro-
tection Clause requires only that the classification rationally further a legitimate state interest.”). 
 28 See infra Part I.C.2. 
 29 See, e.g., Williamson v. Lee Optical Co., 348 U.S. 483, 491 (1955) (sustaining under rational basis 
scrutiny a law requiring optometrists or ophthalmologists to write prescriptions before opticians 
could fit new lenses onto old frames despite apparent motivation to benefit favored healthcare 
professionals); United States v. Carolene Prods. Co., 304 U.S. 144, 154 (1938) (sustaining under 
rational basis scrutiny a ban on filled milk as an adulterated product despite its availability as a 
safe dairy alternative between fresh milk deliveries prior to commonplace refrigeration in rural 
communities, thereby benefitting the fresh milk industry). 
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representative from the minority demographic group.30  Further assume, 
however, that the actual redistricting goals are two-fold: first, to protect a 
nonminority functional incumbent, meaning a sitting representative serving a 
district that will no longer exist in its present form following reapportionment, 
and second, to avoid violating the non-retrogression principle under the Vot-
ing Rights Act of 1965 (“VRA”).31  If the government must prove that the 
prohibited factor, race, did not control its redistricting, it will lose because it 
relied on multiple considerations, and it is impossible to disprove controlling 
reliance on the single factor of race.  Conversely, if the challenger must dis-
prove that the legislature was predominantly motivated by the non-racial fac-
tor of protecting a functional incumbent, she will lose for the same reason.  
When the legislature is motivated by several factors, a subset of which are 
impermissible, whoever bears the burden of proof—meaning whoever is 
called upon to prove the negative—will fail.  In such cases, the rough sort, 
meaning the initial bin placement, controls the outcome. 
Stage two involves fine sorting.  This means going through each bin—
the presumptive goods and the presumptive bads—to locate mistakes.  Mis-
takes take the form of cases whose early sort proved misleading as to the 
eventual outcome.  For those cases initially consigned to the strict scrutiny 
pile (presumptive bads), the challenged law will still survive if the state can 
prove that it was enacted to advance a compelling governmental interest 
and that the means chosen were narrowly tailored to further that interest.  
Conversely, for cases consigned to the rational basis pile (presumptive 
goods), the challenger will still prevail if she can demonstrate the absence of 
a legitimate governmental interest or of means that rationally further that 
interest.  The strict scrutiny test is conjunctive: the state must prove both a 
compelling governmental interest and narrow tailoring for the law to sur-
vive.  And the rational basis test is disjunctive: the challenger need only 
prove the absence of either a legitimate governmental interest or of means 
rationally in furtherance of that interest, to have the law struck down. 
B.  Running with the Red Queen 
“Well, in our country,” said Alice, still panting a little, “you’d generally get to 
somewhere else—if you ran very fast for a long time as we’ve been doing.” 
“A slow sort of country!” said the Queen.  “Now, here, you see, it takes all the 
running you can do, to keep in the same place.  If you want to get somewhere 
 
 30 Cf. League of United Latin Am. Citizens v. Perry, 548 U.S. 399, 447 (2006) (holding that the re-
drawing of lines in District 23 to dilute the influence of Latino voters violated the Voting Rights 
Act). 
 31 42 U.S.C. § 1973c (2012).  For a hypothetical based on Shelby County v. Holder, 133 S. Ct. 2612 
(2013), which limited the force of the preclearance provision under this Act, see text accompany-
ing notes 34–38. 
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else, you must run at least twice as fast as that!”32 
The two-stage sorting system raises an obvious question: if stage-one 
sorting results from factors that correlate to either good or bad laws, why 
bother with stage two?  Laws are enacted as part of a continuous dynamic 
process and with knowledge of the very rules used to classify them.  Law 
making is therefore a Red Queen game in which the judiciary devises rules 
in response to problematic laws; legislators enact responsive laws furthering 
similar objectives while evading detection under existing rules; the judiciary 
refines its rules to locate and strike the refined problematic laws; and so on.33 
Consider, for example, a revised apportionment hypothetical inspired 
by Shelby County v. Holder.34  In Shelby County, the Court invalidated the ongo-
ing application of § 4 of the VRA, which set out the formula for applying 
the preclearance provision in § 5 to covered jurisdictions.35  Chief Justice 
Roberts, writing for the majority, reasoned that since the law’s original en-
actment, southern states had a better record of minority voter turnout than 
their northern counterparts.36  Justice Ginsburg argued in dissent that the 
observed improvement followed the continuous evolution of legal responses 
to constantly changing discriminatory practices.  She explained: “Early at-
tempts to cope with this vile infection resembled battling the Hydra.  
Whenever one form of voting discrimination was identified and prohibited, 
others sprang up in its place.”37 
To illustrate Justice Ginsburg’s intuition, imagine that an early legisla-
ture elected by voters with abhorrent views concerning race produced vot-
ing districts relying on express racial criteria to make electing a black can-
didate implausible.  After expressly identifying particular neighborhoods as 
black or white, the legislature imposed a blanket rule preventing qualified 
voters in black neighborhoods from forming a majority within any single 
district.  Now assume that in a proper constitutional challenge, the Su-
preme Court construes the Fourteenth Amendment Equal Protection 
Clause to invalidate this scheme.  The Court holds that a state cannot rely 
on express racial criteria to apportion voting districts so as to undermine 
minority-voter efforts to elect a representative of their own race.  The ruling 
signals that express racial classifications that undermine the interests of Af-
rican-American voters will be placed in the presumptive bad bin, to which 
strict scrutiny applies, and will almost certainly be struck down. 
 
 32 LEWIS CARROLL, THROUGH THE LOOKING-GLASS AND WHAT ALICE FOUND THERE 42 
(Macmillan Company 1928) (1871). 
 33 For a discussion of Red Queen games in evolutionary biology, see generally MATT RIDLEY, THE 
RED QUEEN: SEX AND THE EVOLUTION OF HUMAN NATURE (1993). 
 34 133 S. Ct. 2612 (2013). 
 35  Id. at 2631. 
 36  Id. at 2625–26. 
 37 Id. at 2633 (Ginsburg, J., dissenting). 
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Assume that the state legislature remains undeterred.  To accomplish its 
objective, it relies on demographic criteria that meaningfully correlate to 
race—zip codes, income data, party registration, and proximity to identi-
fied community organizations or churches—with the same effect of dividing 
black voters as minorities across predominantly white voting districts.  Be-
cause this regime is nominally race neutral, it would be sorted initially into 
the presumptive good bin.  To avoid the end run around its prior rule, the 
Court might hold that despite the initial sorting, when a law’s purpose and 
effect is to prevent minority voters from electing as their representative a 
member of their own race, it fails rational basis scrutiny.  Going forward, 
the Court might declare that race cases meeting its newly minted “purpose-
and-effects test” will be subject to strict scrutiny, and thus sorted into the 
presumptive bad bin.  The game, of course, will continue.38  The legislature 
might, for example, expressly articulate or otherwise signal a primary pur-
pose of protecting the functional incumbency of a non-minority representa-
tive, thus claiming to justify a similar scheme in spite of, rather than be-
cause of, any adverse consequence to African-American voters. 
Fine sorting allows the judiciary to search beyond its initial classification 
(express use of race is presumptively bad), or even its later more refined ini-
tial sorting (racially neutral laws with the purpose and effect of adversely af-
fecting African Americans are presumptively bad).  Neutral classifications 
can mask illicit purposes.  Conversely, non-neutral laws can be coupled 
with benign motivations.  The Court’s two-part test helps to locate laws that 
would readily slip past its inevitably overbroad initial sort, winding up in a 
pile for which the presumptive outcome should not control. 
C.  Getting Beyond the Basic Tiers 
The Supreme Court has decided several prominent cases in a manner 
that thwarts the basic two-tier scheme.  Most notably, it has used strict scru-
tiny to sustain express racial preferences in higher education; before Oberge-
fell, it used rational basis scrutiny to strike down laws implicating the rights 
of sexual minorities; and it has employed a third tier, most notably in the 
context of gender, or sex-based, classifications.  We now consider these doc-
trinal maneuvers. 
 
 38 For another illustration, see Schuette v. Coalition to Defend Affirmative Action, 134 S. Ct. 1623 (2014).  
In Schuette, the Supreme Court sustained a Michigan referendum ending racial preferences in 
state institutions of higher learning against an equal protection challenge based on the political 
participation doctrine.  The debate over the merits of the doctrine between Justice Scalia, con-
curring in the judgment, and Justice Sotomayor, dissenting, reflected a Red Queen Game, with 
Justice Scalia lamenting the apparent evolving standards on which the doctrine rests, see id. at 
1641–42, and with Justice Sotomayor maintaining that the evolving standards reflect an ongoing 
game of judicial decisions invalidating strategies undermining racial progress, revised strategies 
that circumvent those rulings, updated judicial responses, and so on, see id. at 1652, 1654–59. 
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1.  Strict in Theory but Not Fatal (or Feeble?) in Fact 
Although the Supreme Court applies strict scrutiny to any law that 
draws an express racial classification, whether intended to harm or to bene-
fit minorities, this is a fairly recent doctrinal development.  In the landmark 
1978 case, Regents of the University of California v. Bakke,39 Justice Powell issued 
the controlling opinion, the relevant parts of which no one else joined.  Jus-
tice Powell argued for strict scrutiny in race-based affirmative action cases, 
but concluded that the interest in diversity in higher education was compel-
ling.40  He further determined, however, that the medical school’s reliance 
on a racial quota—setting aside sixteen out of one hundred seats for speci-
fied minorities—failed narrow tailoring.41  Justice Brennan, writing sepa-
rately, argued that benign race-based classifications should be subject to in-
termediate scrutiny, rather than strict scrutiny.  Under conventional 
intermediate scrutiny, a challenged law will survive provided that there is 
an important governmental interest and that the selected means substantial-
ly further that interest.42  Writing separately, Justice Stevens construed Title 
VI of the Civil Rights Act of 1964 to ban the use of race in admissions.43  
The combined opinions rendered Justice Powell’s opinion controlling under 
the narrowest grounds rule.44 
Two years later, in Fullilove v. Klutznick, Justice Burger wrote a control-
ling plurality opinion applying intermediate scrutiny to sustain a federal 
program benefitting contractors who formed, or who employed, a minority-
business enterprise (“MBE”). 45  In the 1989 case, City of Richmond v. J.A. 
Croson Co.,46 Justice O’Connor distinguished Fullilove, applying strict scrutiny 
to strike down a structurally parallel program benefitting minority business-
es contracting for work performed for the City of Richmond, Virginia.  Jus-
tice O’Connor observed that whereas the Fourteenth Amendment empow-
ered Congress to regulate matters affecting race, the same amendment 
 
 39 438 U.S. 265 (1978). 
 40  Id. at 314.  
 41  Id. at 320.  
 42 Id. at 359 (Brennan, J., concurring in the judgment in part and dissenting in part).  In more re-
cent gender-based cases, the Supreme Court has vacillated on who bears the burden of proof and 
on how the test is constructed.  For a discussion of later doctrinal tweaks to intermediate scrutiny, 
see infra Part III.B. 
 43 438 U.S. at 412 (Stevens, J., concurring in the judgment in part and dissenting in part). 
 44 The narrowest grounds doctrine selects that opinion consistent with the outcome that has the 
least impact on the law.  Marks v. United States, 430 U.S. 188, 193 (1977) (explaining that when 
“no single rationale enjoys the assent of five Justices,” the Court’s holding is “‘that position taken 
by those Members who concurred in the judgments on the narrowest grounds’”) (citation omit-
ted); see also MAXWELL L. STEARNS, CONSTITUTIONAL PROCESS: A SOCIAL CHOICE ANALYSIS 
OF SUPREME COURT DECISION MAKING 130–33 (2000) (analyzing Bakke under the Marks nar-
rowest grounds doctrine). 
 45 448 U.S. 448, 454, 491 (1980). 
 46 488 U.S. 469, 511 (1989). 
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stripped such power from state and local governments.47  One year later, in 
Metro Broadcasting, Inc. v. FCC,48 Justice Brennan, for the first time, com-
manded majority support in applying intermediate scrutiny to sustain a ra-
cial preference for the issuance of broadcast licenses as applied to a chal-
lenge pursuant to the equal protection component of the Fifth Amendment 
Due Process Clause.49 
Justice Brennan’s victory was short-lived.  In the landmark 1995 decision, 
Adarand Constructors v. Pena,50 Justice O’Connor, writing for a majority, struck 
down a federal MBE set-aside program under strict scrutiny, thus overturning 
Metro Broadcasting.51  Rejecting a broader position expressed in Justice Scalia’s 
concurrence that would ban virtually all use of race, Justice O’Connor, writ-
ing a majority opinion that Justice Scalia nonetheless joined,52 reiterated her 
earlier refutation of Justice Thurgood Marshall’s claim that “strict in theory 
[is] fatal in fact.”53  Up to and including Adarand, Justice O’Connor had never 
voted to sustain a benign use of race,54 raising the question as to what moti-
vated Justice O’Connor to insist that as applied to race, strict scrutiny is some-
how not fatal.  As was borne out eight years later, the critical remaining case 
involved affirmative action in higher education.55  In what Justice Scalia de-
scribed as the “split double header”56—Grutter v. Bollinger57 and Gratz v. Bol-
linger58—the simmering dispute over race-based affirmative action between 
Justice O’Connor and Justice Scalia suddenly boiled. 
In Grutter, Justice O’Connor essentially afforded Justice Powell’s control-
ling Bakke analysis majority-opinion status.59  Although Gratz held that the 
 
 47  Id. at 490–91. 
 48 497 U.S. 547, 564–66 (1990). 
 49 See id. at 564–65 (“We hold that benign race-conscious measures mandated by Congress . . . are 
constitutionally permissible to the extent that they serve important governmental objectives with-
in the power of Congress and are substantially related to achievement of those objectives.”). 
 50 515 U.S. 200 (1995). 
 51  Id. at 227.  
 52 For a discussion of Justice Scalia’s apparently reluctant strategy in joining the majority opinion, 
see Maxwell L. Stearns, The Case for Including Marks v. United States in the Canon of Constitutional 
Law, 17 CONST. COMMENT. 321, 334–35 (2000). 
 53 Compare Fullilove v. Klutznick, 448 U.S. 448, 519 (1980) (Marshall, J., concurring) (arguing that 
strict scrutiny is “strict in theory, but fatal in fact”), with Adarand, 515 U.S. at 237 (“Finally, we 
wish to dispel the notion that strict scrutiny is ‘strict in theory, but fatal in fact.’”). 
 54 Michael Klarman, Are Landmark Court Decisions All That Important?, CHRON. HIGHER EDUC.: 
CHRON. REV. (Aug. 8, 2003), http://chronicle.com/article/Are-Landmark-Court-
Decisions/7437 (“Before Grutter, [Justice O’Connor] had never voted to sustain a race-based af-
firmative-action plan, though she had explicitly noted that such policies might be acceptable un-
der certain stringent conditions.”). 
 55 See id. (“Grutter reveals that O’Connor probably changed her mind about affirmative action over 
the past two decades.”). 
 56 Grutter v. Bollinger, 539 U.S. 306, 348 (2003) (Scalia, J., dissenting). 
 57 539 U.S. 306 (2003). 
 58 539 U.S. 244 (2003). 
 59   Grutter, 539 U.S. at 323. 
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University of Michigan could not use a race-based point system for its un-
dergraduate admissions with a substantial specified allocation for minority 
applicants,60 Grutter held that the law school could give added weight to race 
as part of a holistic admissions process that treated each applicant individu-
ally.61  The Court maintained this distinction despite data demonstrating 
near-perfect precision in the ratio of minority-to-non-minority applicants, 
on the one hand, and the ratio of admitted minority-to-non-minority stu-
dents, on the other.62  Even though the university point system appeared to 
formalize the functional algorithm operating within the law school admis-
sions process on a smaller scale through the constant monitoring of daily 
admissions reports, Justice O’Connor, like Justice Powell before her, insist-
ed that the form the affirmative action process took mattered as much as, if 
not more than, the substantive results obtained. 
The more recent volley with the multi-staged University of Texas af-
firmative action program reveals the Court’s ongoing struggle with the 
Powell-O’Connor doctrinal formulation, which Justice Kennedy eventually 
adopted as his own.  In Fisher v. University of Texas at Austin (Fisher I),63 the 
Supreme Court, with Justice Kennedy writing, remanded a challenge to the 
University of Texas affirmative action program, in which the United States 
Court of Appeals for the Fifth Circuit had applied the Grutter formulation to 
uphold a combined top-ten-percent plan with a holistic race-based affirma-
tive action overlay.  The second phase was designed to ensure a critical 
mass of minority students that included some who, although graduating be-
low the automatic admission threshold, came from more competitive high 
schools and had higher test scores.64  Although in Fisher I, he described the 
Fifth Circuit’s approach as having rendered strict scrutiny “feeble,”65 writ-
ing for the majority in Fisher v. University of Texas at Austin (Fisher II),66  Justice 
Kennedy then affirmed the Fifth Circuit, which on remand had reinstated 
its earlier ruling.  In doing so, Justice Kennedy applied a version of strict 
scrutiny that contravened his earlier call for a less deferential approach. 
The combined cases demonstrate three points.  First, in the context of 
benign race-based preferences, the Court has abandoned intermediate 
scrutiny in favor of strict scrutiny.  Second, in the specific context of race-
 
 60  Gratz, 539 U.S. at 270. 
  61  Grutter, 539 U.S. at 334. 
 62 Id. at 383 (Rehnquist, J., dissenting) (“But the correlation between the percentage of the Law 
School’s pool of applicants who are members of the three minority groups and the percentage of 
the admitted applicants who are members of these same groups is far too precise to be dismissed 
as merely the result of the school paying ‘some attention to [the] numbers.’”) (alteration in origi-
nal). 
 63 133 S. Ct. 2411, 2415 (2013).  For a more detailed analysis of Fisher I, see infra Part II.F.2.b. 
 64  Id. at 2416. 
 65 Id. at 2421. 
 66 136 S. Ct. 2198 (2016). 
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based affirmative action in state institutions of higher learning, strict in the-
ory is not fatal in fact, and the Supreme Court has struggled to ensure that 
this does not render it feeble in fact.  And third, wherever the non-fatal-
non-feeble test lies, it is not intermediate scrutiny (Category 3). 
2.  Rational in Theory but Strict in Fact 
Just as the Court has salvaged race-based affirmative action while nomi-
nally applying strict scrutiny, so too, leading into Obergefell, it had invalidated 
laws adversely affecting sexual minorities while nominally applying rational 
basis scrutiny.67  Recall that absent a justificatory trigger for strict scrutiny, 
the Court applies rational basis scrutiny, under which it typically sustains the 
challenged law.68  The line of cases testing this intuition involves claims of an-
imus against politically unpopular groups.  In USDA v. Moreno, the Court 
struck down the denial of benefits under the Food Stamp Act of 1964, which 
banned households with unrelated cohabitants from eligibility.69  The case 
involved sympathetic plaintiffs, including the mother of a hearing-impaired 
girl who had moved in with another woman on public assistance to provide 
mutual financial support while the girl attended a specialized school.70 
Justice Brennan, writing for the majority, struck down this eligibility provi-
sion on the ground that it was premised on an animus against “‘hippies’ and 
‘hippie communes.’”71  Justice Brennan held that it is never rational to exhibit 
an animus against a politically unpopular group.72  Then-Associate Justice 
Rehnquist dissented, arguing that the law satisfied conventional rational basis 
scrutiny by reducing the likelihood that cohabitants have come together for 
the purpose of receiving public benefits, thereby reducing fraud.73 
Although Justice Brennan rejoined that the statute contained separate an-
ti-fraud provisions,74 under ordinary rational basis review, that would not 
have mattered.  The test requires no more than one legitimate governmental 
interest and means that rationally further that interest.  A set of cumulative 
anti-fraud provisions within an elaborate public-welfare scheme would satisfy 
that test.  The only way to hold that the cohabitation provision was motivat-
ed by animus—an obviously illegitimate purpose—was to read out an other-
 
 67 See infra Part III.C. 
 68  See supra notes 22–25 and accompanying text. 
 69 413 U.S. 528, 529 (1973). 
 70 Id. at 532. 
 71 Id. at 534. 
 72 Id. (“For if the constitutional conception of ‘equal protection of the laws’ means anything, it must 
at the very least mean that a bare congressional desire to harm a politically unpopular group 
cannot constitute a legitimate governmental interest.”). 
 73 Id. at 546 (Rehnquist, J., dissenting) (“This unit provides a guarantee which is not provided by 
households containing unrelated individuals that the household exists for some purpose other 
than to collect federal food stamps.”). 
 74 Id. at 536–37 (majority opinion). 
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wise legitimate justification.75  But that is not standard rational basis review. 
The Court extended its Moreno analysis in City of Cleburne v. Cleburne Living 
Center.76  In that case, a city denied a special-use permit that would have al-
lowed an investor to convert a building into a home for adults with intellec-
tual disabilities.77  The Court rejected several justifications for the denial,78 
and it concluded instead that it was based on an illicit animus against such 
persons, which, once more, was not a permissible basis in support of the 
law.79  Again, however, this is not conventional rational basis review. 
However problematic normatively, it is not irrational to imagine that 
the permit denial resulted from community concerns that, if approved, the 
plan would reduce property values.  Preserving property values is not mere-
ly rational; it is a central function of local government.  And this justifica-
tion does not necessarily turn on animus.  A group of residents could readi-
ly argue that although they wish that others in their community, or 
potential purchasers, shared their unbiased views so that the proposed use 
would not adversely affect local property values, the unfortunate contrary 
reality explains their opposition. 
To be sure, such arguments were rightly rejected in the context of re-
strictive covenants excluding, typically, African Americans and Jews.  De-
fending such laws on the ground that blatant racial or religious restrictive 
covenants preserve land values is no longer a credible legal position.  But 
rather than helping the Cleburne majority, this merely underscores the ana-
lytical difficulty.  State-supported restrictions based on race or religion trig-
ger strict scrutiny.80  Even an arguably rational, albeit disturbing, justifica-
tion related to property values as the basis for racial or religious exclusions 
thankfully will not suffice.  Instead, the state would have to offer a compel-
ling justification plus narrow tailoring.  Preserving the value of real estate 
through racial or religious bigotry easily fails this stringent test. 
Despite these analytical difficulties, explaining the Court’s reliance on ra-
 
 75 Accord Calvin Massey, The New Formalism: Requiem for Tiered Scrutiny?, 6 U. PA. J. CONST. L. 945, 
952 (2004) (“[I]n those few cases in which the Supreme Court has concluded that legislation sub-
ject to minimal scrutiny lacks a legitimate purpose, it has generally eschewed the search for any 
conceivable hypothetical purpose and focused on what the Court views as the government’s ac-
tual purpose.”). 
 76 473 U.S. 432 (1985). 
 77 Id. at 436–37.  The once-common term “mental retardation” has been replaced with “intellectual 
disability.”  See Rosa’s Law, Pub. L. No. 111-256, 124 Stat. 2643 (2010) (updating terminology in 
federal statutes). 
 78 The expressed concerns included: negative attitudes of property owners to the project, fears of 
elderly residents, concerns that students at the neighboring junior high school might harass resi-
dents, and location on a 500-year flood plain.  City of Cleburne, 473 U.S. at 448–49. 
 79  Id. at 450. 
 80 The Supreme Court relied upon a bootstraping analysis, which deemed judicial enforecement of 
private covenants state action, to render these devices constitutionally impermissible in Shelley v. 
Kraemer, 334 U.S. 1, 19 (1948). 
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tional basis scrutiny in this context is not difficult.  In other contexts, for ex-
ample, driving or being held responsible for contractual obligations, distin-
guishing those with intellectual disabilities from the general adult population 
makes sense, as does the inclusion of cumulative anti-fraud provisions in a 
welfare law.  The animus analysis has the feature of a one-time ticket, invali-
dating each of the laws in question without calling the presumptive validity of 
future laws, for example, those affecting persons with intellectual disabilities 
or those imposing welfare-access restrictions, into question more generally. 
The cases involving sexual minorities, discussed below, modify this analysis 
in two important ways.  First, the idea of a one-time ticket plays out differently 
in the context of a body of case law that was largely designed to help forge a 
path toward finding a constitutional right, here to same-sex marriage.81  Se-
cond, applying rational basis scrutiny while striking down a challenged law re-
sults in casting aspersions on those who disagree, or what Robert Nagel has 
called judicial “name-calling,”82 a feature that appears to have contributed to 
Justice Kennedy’s decision to rest Obergefell on an alternative ground.  
In Romer v. Evans, the state of Colorado enacted Amendment 2 through a 
statewide initiative.83  The Amendment prohibited sexual orientation, or oth-
er sexual-minority status, from inclusion in state or local antidiscrimination 
laws.84  Prior to that Amendment, various localities had amended their anti-
discrimination laws, which typically included categories such as race, religion, 
and gender, to also include sexual orientation or other minority-sexual sta-
tus.85  Justice Kennedy, writing for the Romer Court, struck down Amend-
ment 2, relying principally on the Moreno and Cleburne animus rationales.86 
In dissent, Justice Scalia maintained that because it was permissible to 
criminalize same-sex intimacy—Romer was issued before Lawrence v. Texas 
overruled Bowers v. Hardwick—it was also permissible to deny special bene-
fits to individuals with a “self-avowed tendency or desire” to engage in such 
intimacies.87  Justice Scalia further advanced a process-driven justification, 
claiming it was not irrational in a multilevel democracy to take an issue 
about which gays and lesbians had scored local victories in municipal law-
making processes, and ratchet upward the decision-making level statewide 
 
 81 Maxwell L. Stearns, Private-Rights Adjudication and the Normative Foundations of Durable Constitutional 
Precedent, in PRECEDENT IN THE UNITED STATES SUPREME COURT 77 (Christopher J. Peters ed., 
2013); Maxwell L. Stearns, Grains of Sand or Butterfly Effect: Standing, the Legitimacy of Precedent, and Re-
flections on Hollingsworth and Windsor, 65 ALA. L. REV. 349 (2013) [hereinafter Grains of Sand]. 
 82 ROBERT F. NAGEL, JUDICIAL POWER AND AMERICAN CHARACTER: CENSORING OURSELVES 
IN AN ANXIOUS AGE 124, 126 (1994) (positing that a “sinister description of ‘the proponents’” 
proved relevant, perhaps necessary, to support the claim that the challenged law lacked a rational 
basis).  See infra Part III.C. 
 83 517 U.S. 620, 623 (1996). 
 84 Id. at 624. 
 85 Id. at 623–24. 
 86 Id. at 631–32. 
 87 Romer, 517 U.S. at 642 (Scalia, J., dissenting). 
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for ultimate resolution.88 
In his Romer dissent, Justice Scalia relied in part on Bowers, a case that 
Lawrence later overruled, to defend as rational the systematic exclusion of 
minority sexual orientation from the list of protected statuses under state 
and local antidiscrimination laws.89  After Romer, Lawrence struck down a 
Texas consensual sodomy statute that, unlike the Georgia statute sustained 
in Bowers, specifically targeted same-sex intimacy.90  Justice Kennedy once 
again wrote the majority opinion, and, as in Romer, he declined to apply 
strict scrutiny.91  Although Justice Kennedy’s choice of selected tier is im-
precise, the more plausible reading supports rational basis.92  The Lawrence 
Court thus further supported the doctrinal anomaly that rational in theory 
can be strict, or even fatal, in fact. 
The relationship between Romer, an equal protection case, and Lawrence, 
a due process case, is especially important in light of the decision to rest 
Obergefell primarily on due process grounds.  In Lawrence, Justice Kennedy 
reasoned that the historical analysis in the Bowers majority opinion was 
deeply flawed, and that when sexual activity is not viewed as a series of iso-
lated events, but rather as part of a defining bond between committed part-
ners, it became evident that singling out the particular intimacy of consen-
sual same-sex partners for criminality lacks a substantial justification.93  For 
Justice Kennedy, this insight was essential in honoring the dignity of com-
mitted same-sex partners. 
The Lawrence holding would have been more easily achieved had the 
Court identified same-sex intimacy as a fundamental right triggering strict 
scrutiny, as it had the right to birth control,94 and to terminate pre-viability 
pregnancies.95  Justice Kennedy declined to do that, however, perhaps moti-
vated by the desire to avoid forecasting a fundamental right to same-sex mar-
riage.  Even so, Justice Scalia claimed that the Lawrence dignity analysis ren-
 
 88 Id. at 639 (claiming a right to retain victories from lower levels in a multi-tiered democracy is 
“unheard of”).  Unlike in Moreno and Cleburne, where the rationales set aside under rational basis 
review related to the merits, in Romer, the rationale set aside related to the process of enactment. 
 89 Id. at 640–41. 
 90 Lawrence v. Texas, 539 U.S. 558, 566, 578 (2002). 
 91 Id. at 578. 
 92 Although Justice Kennedy employed the term “substantial” at various points in his opinion, see, 
for example, id. at 565; id. at 572, the overall opinion does not appear to rely on either intermedi-
ate or strict scrutiny.  Most notably, Justice Kennedy did not refute Justice Scalia’s observation 
that the majority had applied rational basis review.  Id. at 586 (Scalia, J., dissenting). 
 93 Id. at 567 (majority opinion) (describing sexual intimacy as part of “a personal bond that is more 
enduring”). 
 94 Griswold v. Connecticut, 381 U.S. 479, 485 (1965). 
 95 Roe v. Wade, 410 U.S. 113, 155 (1973); see also Planned Parenthood of Southeastern Pa. v. Ca-
sey, 505 U.S. 833, 846 (1992) (plurality) (reclassifying a woman’s interest in abortion as a liberty 
interest, rather than a fundamental right). 
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dered an eventual ruling finding a right to same sex-marriage inevitable.96 
In United States v. Windsor,97 Justice Kennedy further relied on the ani-
mus analysis as the basis for striking down § 3 of the Defense of Marriage 
Act (“DOMA”).  After citing the relevant line of cases, Justice Kennedy 
stated, “The avowed purpose and practical effect of the law here in ques-
tion are to impose a disadvantage, a separate status, and so a stigma upon 
all who enter into same-sex marriages made lawful by the unquestioned au-
thority of the States.”98  In dissent, Justice Scalia further maintained that 
the majority opinion had not resolved what he viewed as the central issue in 
the case: “The opinion does not resolve and indeed does not even men-
tion . . . whether, under the Equal Protection Clause, laws restricting mar-
riage to a man and a woman are reviewed for more than mere rationali-
ty.”99  Justice Scalia was correct.  Although Justice Kennedy had shown 
that rationality review is sometimes fatal, he had not yet resolved the ques-
tion that most thought controlling in context of same-sex marriage, namely 
which tier of scrutiny the Court would apply. 
3.  Intermediate in Theory but Either Strict or Rational in Fact 
The final complication for tiers of scrutiny analysis involves intermedi-
ate scrutiny in gender- or sex-based classifications.  This was the standard 
that many envisioned in the context of same-sex marriage, and that, as pre-
viously explained, had been applied then rejected, in the context of affirma-
tive action.100 
The history of equal protection review of gender-based classifications is 
well known.101  What started as a seemingly more piercing rational basis 
scrutiny quickly emerged as a formal third tier.  That tier requires proof of 
an important governmental interest and means substantially in furtherance 
 
 96 See Lawrence, 539 U.S. at 604 (Scalia, J., dissenting) (“At the end of its opinion—after having laid 
waste the foundations of our rational-basis jurisprudence—the Court says that the present case 
‘does not involve whether the government must give formal recognition to any relationship that 
homosexual persons seek to enter.’ . . . Do not believe it.”).  See also infra note 99 and accompany-
ing text.  Assuming Justice Scalia believed that Lawrence and United States v. Windsor, 133 S. Ct. 
2675 (2013), controlled Obergefell, one might have envisioned a concurrence in the judgment, la-
menting precedents to which he was bound as a matter of ironic consistency.  That was not the 
approach Justice Scalia ultimately chose.  See Obergefell v. Hodges, 135 U.S. 2584, 2626 (Scalia, 
J., dissenting). 
 97 Windsor, 133 S. Ct. at 2682.  For a further discussion of Windsor, see infra Part III.C. 
 98 Id. at 2693. 
 99 Id. at 2706 (Scalia, J., dissenting). 
100 See supra Part I.C.1. 
101 As is the history of substituting the grammatical term “gender” in place of the anatomical term 
“sex.”  See Adam Liptak, Ginsburg Shares Views on Influence of Foreign Law on Her Court, and Vice Versa, 
N.Y. TIMES, Apr. 12, 2009, at A14 (crediting Ginsburg’s secretary, who was concerned with im-
proper connotations of “sex,” with the substitution). 
June 2017] THE INVERSION OF TIERS 1063 
of that interest.102  The results have been mixed, as the Court has neither 
systematically struck down nor sustained such classifications.  The dividing 
line appears to be that the Court sustains policies based on its perception of 
real differences between the sexes or of laws seeking to overcome the pre-
sent effects of historically adverse treatment of women, primarily in work-
place settings.  Conversely, the Court strikes down policies it believes reflect 
“overbroad generalizations” about the sexes,103 sometimes called “old fogy-
ism.”104  Two relatively recent cases demonstrate the analytical difficulties 
these cases have presented. 
In United States v. Virginia,105 Justice Ginsburg, writing for a majority, 
struck down the exclusion of women from the Virginia Military Institute 
(“VMI”), a state military-style academy that prided itself on the adversative 
method of training and its Spartan barracks life and dining arrangements, 
especially for first years, referred to as “rats.”  Under conventional interme-
diate scrutiny, the exclusion of women was arguably justified by the requi-
site accommodations respecting privacy and physical exertion imposed on 
rats and even upperclassmen before women could enter the program.  For 
that reason, the Commonwealth developed the Virginia Women’s Institute 
for Leadership (“VWIL”), housed at the all-women’s Mary Baldwin Col-
lege, for women interested in developing military-style leadership skills in 
what the creators regarded as a more congenial setting.106 
As Justice Ginsburg observed, the differences between the two pro-
grams—VMI and VWIL—were profound, including philosophical differ-
ences in pedagogy, with VWIL focused on group participation and building 
self-esteem rather than the breakdown-and-rebuild model embodied in the 
adversative method, and qualitative differences in degree programs, faculty, 
and opportunities for alumni networking.107  The Virginia case thus resem-
bled Sweatt v. Painter,108 as the Court drew parallels between VWIL in the 
context of gender and the obviously inadequate effort by Texas to construct 
a law school for blacks in lieu of admission to the flagship University of Tex-
as School of Law in the context of race.109  Still, there were notable differ-
ences between Virginia and Sweatt, not the least of which was the context—
gender, not race—and the doctrine—intermediate scrutiny, not strict. 
If intermediate scrutiny accommodates legislation recognizing real-sex 
differences and if admitting women requires changing institutional accul-
 
102 Craig v. Boren, 429 U.S. 190, 197 (1976). 
103 United States v. Virginia, 518 U.S. 515, 533 (1996). 
104 Id. at 543 (citation omitted). 
105 Id. at 556–58. 
106 Id. at 526–27. 
107 Id. 
108 339 U.S. 629 (1950). 
109 Virginia, 518 U.S. at 553–54. 
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turation and pedagogy, then a small number of women seeking admission 
to VMI would not suffice to invalidate the exclusion of women.  Given the 
preexisting understanding of the test to accommodate laws reflecting such 
differences between the sexes, Justice Ginsburg thus had to refine interme-
diate scrutiny to strike the law down.  She did so by stating that the gov-
ernment has the burden to show an “exceedingly persuasive justification” 
for its policy,110 which must be contemporaneous, and thus intended at the 
time of enactment, rather than constructed to justify the policy after the 
fact.111  This doctrinal transformation had three important components. 
First, the burden of proof is squarely on the government.  Second, an “ex-
ceedingly persuasive justification” is closer to “compelling” than “im-
portant.”  Third, that justification must be contemporaneous. 
The contemporaneity requirement proved essential in striking VMI’s 
exclusion of women.  Even if the adversative system and spartan barracks 
life were grounded in important pedagogical concerns that justified exclud-
ing women, which the majority refuted,112 that was irrelevant if the Virginia 
legislature did not rest on those reasons when creating VMI in 1839.  As 
Chief Justice Rehnquist observed in his concurrence in the judgment, since 
Virginia was unaware of any obligation to offer such a program to women 
until, at the earliest, the 1982 decision, Mississippi University for Women v. Ho-
gan,113 which held that an all-women’s nursing program violated the equal 
protection rights of men, the majority analysis produced a constitutional 
anachronism.114 
This strict version of intermediate scrutiny did not last.  In Tuan Anh 
Nguyen v. INS,115 Justice Kennedy, writing for a majority, sustained an INS 
 
110 Id. at 524 (citations omitted). 
111 Id. at 536 (citations omitted). 
112 Id. at 549–50. 
113 458 U.S. 718, 733 (1982). 
114 Virginia, 518 U.S. at 561–62 (Rehnquist, C.J., concurring). 
115 533 U.S. 53, 58–59 (2001).  As this Article was nearing publication, the Supreme Court issued 
Sessions v. Morales-Santana, 137 S. Ct. 1678 (2017) (Gorsuch, J., recused), which continued the 
ongoing volley as to whether intermediate scrutiny, as applied to parental sex-based immigration 
distinctions, is lite or heavy.  The case involved a Fifth Amendment Due Process Clause chal-
lenge to § 1401(a)(7) of the Immigration and Nationality Act, 8 U.S.C. § 1401(a)(7) (1958 ed.).  Id. 
at 1686 n.1.  The provision imposed a longer—ten-year, five of which must be post-age four-
teen—durational residency requirement on U.S. citizen fathers, as compared to a one-year dura-
tional residency requirement for U.S. citizen mothers, who are the parents with a non-U.S. citi-
zen of an illegitimate child born outside the United States who later seeks to become a U.S. 
citizen.  The child of a deceased U.S. citizen father, who fell short of the post-age fourteen, five-
year requirement by twenty days, and who was himself subject to deportation due to his criminal 
record, brought suit.  Id. at 1686.  He claimed that because he would have been granted citizen-
ship status, thereby preventing deportation, had his mother been a U.S. citizen, the statute vio-
lated his equal protection rights as applied to the federal government under the Fifth Amendment 
Due Process Clause.  
   Justice Ginsburg wrote for a majority of six, including Justice Kennedy, who wrote the Ngu-
yen majority opinion.  (Justices Thomas wrote a concurrence in the judgment that Justice Alito 
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policy that automatically conferred citizenship status on the foreign-born 
illegitimate children of U.S. citizen mothers, but that required affirmative 
steps prior to maturity before similarly situated children of U.S. citizen fa-
thers could acquire citizenship.116  The Nguyen majority held that real sex 
differences justified the policy because whereas fathers of illegitimate chil-
dren are often unaware of the conception, let alone birth, of the child, 
mothers of illegitimate children are invariably aware of their births and are 
thus more likely to form meaningful parental bonds.117  Even though at the 
time of enactment, one consideration was proof of paternity, a concern 
overtaken by DNA testing, that contemporaneous justification proved irrel-
evant.  Justice Kennedy’s opinion omitted any discussion of exceedingly 
persuasive justifications that the government must prove.  Instead, he re-
verted to the pre-Virginia intermediate scrutiny analysis, which generally de-
ferred to claims of real-sex differences. 
This analysis raises two important points: First, although the Court has 
articulated an intermediate scrutiny standard, in this context the test does 
no real work.  Behind the intermediate scrutiny veil, the Court readily sorts 
into the presumptively good bin (intermediate lite) those laws based on real 
differences or that remedy past adverse treatment and into the presump-
tively bad bin (intermediate heavy) those laws based on “old fogyism.”  Of 
course the old-fashioned two-tiered scheme, with rational basis in place of 
intermediate lite and strict scrutiny in place of intermediate heavy, is entire-
ly adequate to this binary task.  Both the Virginia case, which required rede-
fining intermediate scrutiny to strike down a law implicating a real sex dif-
 
joined, and Justice Gorsuch did not participate).  In her opinion, Justice Ginsburg ratcheted back 
up the demands of intermediate scrutiny consistent with her earlier opinion, United States v. Virgin-
ia, albeit by distinguishing, not overruling, INS v. Nguyen.  She reasoned that whereas Nguyen in-
volved the validity of a sex-based parental acknowledgement requirement, thus arguably promot-
ing connectedness to the United States, Morales-Santana instead involved a challenge to the more 
attenuated sex-based parental durational residency requirement.  Although Ginsburg determined 
that the statutory distinction drawn in § 1401(a)(7) violated due process, she nonetheless denied 
relief on the ground that the Supreme Court was not empowered to level-up a remedy respecting 
naturalization.  Id. at 1698.  Because the Court ultimately denied Mr. Morales-Santana relief, the 
Court’s due process analysis, including its elevation of the intermediate scrutiny test, might be 
construed as dictum.  See generally Michael Abramowicz & Maxwell Stearns, Defining Dicta, 57 
STAN. L. REV. 953 (2005).  Whether this part of the opinion is holding or dictum, however, has 
no bearing on the dimensionality analysis.  In either case, the question remains where to draw the 
permissibility line along a single dimension of gender and anti-subordination.  See also United 
States v. Flores-Villar, 536 F.3d 990, 993 (9th Cir. 2008) (determining that, based on the Su-
preme Court’s decision in Nguyen, “intermediate scrutiny applies to Flores-Villar’s gender-based 
claim and rational basis review applies to his age-based claim, [such that] the residence require-
ments of [the Immigration and Nationality Act, 8 U.S.C.] §§ 1401(a)(7) and 1409 survive.”), aff’d 
by an equally divided court, 564 U.S. 210, 210 (2011) (per curiam) (Kagan, J., recused). 
116 For a discussion of a fractured-panel predecessor case raising closely related issues, Miller v. Al-
bright, 523 U.S. 420 (1998), including a breakdown of the opinions, see STEARNS, supra note 44, at 
7–14. 
117 Nguyen, 533 U.S. at 70, 73. 
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ference,118 and the more recent case, Sessions v. Morales-Santana, which, alt-
hough not overruling Nguyen, had a similar effect, suggest that the interme-
diate scrutiny volley continues.119 
Second, the analysis helps to explain why Justice Kennedy avoided 
treating restrictions on same-sex marriage as a gender-based classification 
in Obergefell.  Justice Kennedy had already resolved intermediate scrutiny 
away from Justice Ginsburg’s stricter Virginia version.  Although Justice 
Kennedy could easily have distinguished Nguyen in Obergefell given their very 
different contexts, he might have reasoned that treating a same-sex mar-
riage bans as an illicit gender-based classification would nonetheless force a 
retreat from his skeptical stance on strict intermediate scrutiny. 
D.  Critiques and Proposals 
This case survey suffices to explain the critical reception that the Su-
preme Court’s approach to tiers of scrutiny has received.  Although aspects 
of the scheme are not without defenders,120 commentators have generally 
criticized the Court’s approach, focusing on apparent doctrinal inconsisten-
cies, disingenuous applications of standards, and outcomes that seem overly 
determined by the chosen tier.121  These concerns have given rise to myri-
ad, sometimes conflicting, doctrinal prescriptions.  Most notably, proposals 
for reform have included Justice Stevens’s advocating abandoning tiers of 
scrutiny altogether in favor of a uniform approach to all equal protection 
cases,122 and Justice Marshall’s advocating for a broad array of tiers, linked 
 
118  See supra notes 97–98 and accompanying text 
119 For a discussion of Sessions v. Morales-Santana, 137 S. Ct. 1678 (2017), and United States v. 
Flores-Villar, 536 F.3d 990 (9th Cir. 2008), see supra note 115.  
120 See, e.g., Jay D. Wexler, Defending the Middle Way: Intermediate Scrutiny as Judicial Minimalism, 66 GEO. 
WASH. L. REV. 298, 329 (1998) (“Intermediate scrutiny . . . is generally a better solution to ana-
logical crisis [of the sort characterized by comparing race, sex, and sexual preference] than deny-
ing certiorari, implementing a sliding-scale approach, or announcing a maximalist rule.”). 
121 See Andrew M. Siegel, Equal Protection Unmodified: Justice John Paul Stevens and the Case for Unmediated 
Constitutional Interpretation, 74 FORDHAM L. REV. 2339, 2343–46 (2006) (summarizing “[s]tandard 
[c]ritiques of [t]iered [r]eview,” including lack of guidance, excessive rigidity, and inadequate 
normative foundation). 
122 See Craig v. Boren, 429 U.S. 190, 211–12 (1976) (Stevens, J., concurring) (“There is only one 
Equal Protection Clause.  It requires every State to govern impartially.  It does not direct the 
courts to apply one standard of review in some cases and a different standard in other cases.”); see 
also Suzanne B. Goldberg, Equality Without Tiers, 77 S. CAL. L. REV. 481, 484 (2004) (“[T]he 
problems with the three-tiered framework for judicial scrutiny are sufficient to warrant immedi-
ate consideration of an alternative standard for review, such as the single standard proposed 
here . . . .”); Lawrence G. Sager, Of Tiers of Scrutiny and Time Travel: A Reply to Dean Sullivan, 90 
CALIF. L. REV. 819, 824 (2002) (“The hard-judicial-look approach [set out in United States v. Vir-
ginia] could and should become the norm in both racial and gender cases.”); Jeffrey M. Shaman, 
Cracks in the Structure: The Coming Breakdown of the Levels of Scrutiny, 45 OHIO ST. L.J. 161, 177 (1984) 
(“The multiple tiers could be transformed readily into a comprehensive system based upon the 
unitary standard . . . which in all instances would inquire whether there is an appropriate gov-
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to the invidiousness of the classification or the importance of the claimed 
right.123  More recently, in avoiding discussing tiers altogether, Justice Ken-
nedy has at least implicitly offered yet another approach.124 
Although the system of tiers is problematic, the discussion that follows 
explains why none of these prescriptive approaches can succeed in repair-
ing it.  A system resembling tiers of scrutiny is an inevitable feature of equal 
protection doctrine.  Applying the existing tiers would be simpler and more 
compelling if the Court better related its scheme of tiers to the dimensional-
ity of the underlying case law. 
II.  TIERS AND DIMENSIONALITY 
The following discussion offers an innovative framework for analyzing 
tiers of scrutiny.  We begin with a simple numerical illustration.  Although 
the example does not capture the nuance and complexity of constitutional 
doctrine, abstracting away from such detail, and then adding layers of 
complexity, will help relate the essential concepts to underlying cases. 
A.  Odds, Evens, Primes, and Non-Primes 
Consider a simple binary division of whole numbers as odd or even, 
presented horizontally in Table 3.125  These broad categories, resting along 
a single dimension, suffice to sort as small a set as two consecutive integers 
(2, 3), or infinite integers (2, 3, 4, etc.), based on whether that number can 
be divided by two while yielding another whole number.  None of the 
numbers listed as odds (3, 5, 7, etc.) meet this criterion; all numbers listed 
under evens (2, 4, 6, 8, etc.) do.  These two categories, resting along the 
odds/evens dimension, suffice for this elementary sorting task even over po-
tentially infinite whole numbers.  
 
ernmental interest suitably furthered by the governmental action in question.”) (citation omitted) 
(internal quotation marks omitted). 
123 See San Antonio Indep. Sch. Dist. v. Rodriguez, 411 U.S. 1, 98–99 (1972) (Marshall, J., dissent-
ing) (“A principled reading of what this Court has done reveals that it has applied a spectrum of 
standards in reviewing discrimination allegedly violative of the Equal Protection Clause.  This 
spectrum clearly comprehends variations in the degree of care with which the Court will scruti-
nize particular classifications, depending, I believe, on the constitutional and societal importance 
of the interest adversely affected and the recognized invidiousness of the basis upon which the 
particular classification is drawn.”); see also James E. Fleming, “There Is Only One Equal Protection 
Clause”: An Appreciation of Justice Stevens’s Equal Protection Jurisprudence, 74 FORDHAM L. REV. 2301, 
2311 (2006) (concluding from review of cases that Justice Stevens and Justice Marshall were cor-
rect that “[t]here is only one Equal Protection Clause, with a ‘continuum of judgmental respons-
es’ or a ‘spectrum of standards.’”). 
124 See infra Part II.C. (relating Kennedy’s avoidance of tiers to Justice Stevens’s and Justice Mar-
shall’s proposals). 
125 Whole numbers are the subset of integers that are non-negative. 
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TABLE 3 
DIMENSIONALITY IN CATEGORIZING INTEGERS 
 Odds Evens 
Primes 3, 5, 7, 9, 11, 13, 17, 19 . . . 2 
Non-Primes 9, 15, 21, . . .  4, 6, 8, . . . 
 
Now consider adding another criterion: is each listed integer a prime 
number, meaning a whole number larger than 1 that can only be divided by 
itself and 1 while generating a whole number?  Sorting whole numbers as 
odd or even cannot complete this sorting task.  The difficulty is that the 
number 2 is an even prime, whereas the remaining primes are a subset of 
odds.  The number 2 is thus the mathematical equivalent of an aloft hot air 
balloon.126  Without introducing the separate primes/non-primes categories, 
even the simple sequence of integers—234—presented in bold in Table 3 
cannot be sorted according to the criteria of odd/even, prime/non-prime.  
This holds even though either binary scheme—odds/evens or primes/non-
primes—suffices to sort infinite data,127 and even though a single dimension 
can capture multiple criteria that move in a common direction.128 
Constitutional doctrine is obviously more complex than sorting integers.  
And yet, assessing challenged laws based on tiers of scrutiny implicates a 
similar dimensionality problem.  As with integers, infinite cases or chal-
lenged laws can be sorted over two tiers—rational basis or strict scrutiny—
that rest along a single dimension, provided that the dimension accurately 
captures the relevant normative stakes.  And yet, certain constitutional hot 
air balloons—affirmative action and cases implicating politically unpopular 
groups that are neither suspect nor quasi-suspect—can thwart a sorting 
scheme that fails to appreciate the need for an additional dimension.  The 
remainder of this Part explores these points in the context of evolving rules. 
 
126 The dimensionality analysis also helps to explain why the original sequence of tiers, 12345, is less 
predictive than the peculiar sequence, 14325.  See supra Tables 1 and 2; see also supra note 15 (clari-
fying assumptions). 
127 Thus, for each listed dimension, we can overlay an additional normative criterion—small to 
large—without forcing yet another dimension.  In Table 3, starting in the upper left and moving 
clockwise or counterclockwise, for each box we can plot an infinite sequence from small to large.  
See Table 3. 
128 By combining categories vertically or horizontally along each separate dimension, Table 3 reveals 
small-to-large odds or evens (the horizontal dimension), and small-to-large primes or non-primes 
(the vertical dimension). 
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B.  Shifting Lines Along a Single Dimension 
A single dimension can accommodate not only infinite data, but also 
changes in how we sort data over time.  Imagine the need to divide children 
and adults.  In the ancient Jewish tradition, the age of thirteen marked the 
Bar Mitzvah (for boys only, with girls considered adults at twelve).129  Even 
the most devout Jew would no longer consider a boy of thirteen (or a girl of 
twelve) an adult.130  For a long time within the United States and elsewhere, 
many marked adulthood at the age of eighteen, corresponding roughly to 
completing high school.  For many, meaningful responsibility is deferred 
through the end of college, typically age twenty-two.  And the Affordable 
Care Act (“ACA”) treats offspring up to age twenty-six as “children” for in-
surance purposes,131 potentially extending dependency through the comple-
 
129 See THE NEW ENCYCLOPEDIA OF JUDAISM 106, 109–10 (Geoffrey Wigoder et al. eds., 2d ed. 
2002) (dating earliest liturgical bat mitzvah ceremony to the 1920s). 
130 That is, other than for the very limited purpose of counting toward a minyan, the requisite quor-
um of ten required for collective prayer.  Id. at 106.  This also marks the point of assuming per-
sonal responsibility for mitsvot, or religious good deeds.  Id. 
131 Patient Protection & Affordable Care Act, Pub. L. No. 111-148, § 1001(a)(5), 124 Stat. 119, 132 (2010) 
(codified at 42 U.S.C. § 300gg-14) (amending § 2714(a) of the Public Health Service Act) (requiring in-
surers offering coverage for the dependent children of beneficiaries to cover “an adult child (who is not 
married) until the child turns 26”).  During his campaign and in the early months of his presidency, 
President Donald Trump pledged to “repeal and replace” the ACA, also known as “Obamacare.”  
Early on, his administration took steps toward repeal, but without putting forth a comprehensive re-
placement proposal.  See Mark Landler, Trump Says Health Law Replacement May Not Be Ready Until Next 
Year, N.Y. TIMES (Feb. 5, 2017), https://www.nytimes.com/2017/02/05/us/politics/donald-trump-
health-care-law-repeal-replace-plan.html (noting that President Trump stated in an interview that a re-
placement health care law would likely not be ready until the end of 2017 or 2018 but that he had 
“signed an executive order to begin unwinding the [ACA]” in January 2017); Julie Hirschfeld Davis & 
Robert Pear, Trump Issues Executive Order Scaling Back Parts of Obamacare, N.Y. TIMES (Jan. 20, 2017), 
https://www.nytimes.com/2017/01/20/us/politics/trump-executive-order-obamacare.html (describ-
ing President Trump’s first executive order, which “directed government agencies to scale back as many 
aspects of the [ACA] as possible,” but noting that the President had yet to devise a replacement plan).  
   After the House finally approved a plan to repeal Obamacare, albeit without a comprehen-
sive alternative plan that would, for example, ensure coverage for those with pre-existing condi-
tions, Republican Senate leaders proved unable to satisfactorily amend the bill.  They instead 
moved to send a slightly modified version of the House bill to the Senate floor, opening it more 
broadly to motions to amend.  The leadership simultaneously sought assurances from their 
House counterparts that the bill, which became known as the “skinny repeal,” would not be 
passed and sent to the President in its then-existing form should the Senate pass it.  Juliet Eilperin 
et al., Senate Rejects Measure to Partly Repeal Affordable Care Act, Dealing GOP Leaders a Major Setback, 
WASH. POST (July 28, 2017), https://www.washingtonpost.com/powerpost/senate-gop-leaders-
work-to-round-up-votes-for-modest-health-care-overhaul/2017/07/27/ac08fc40-72b7-11e7-
8839-ec48ec4cae25_story.html (noting that Senators McCain, Graham, and Johnson had sought 
“an iron-clad guarantee . . . that . . . the House would not move to quickly approve the bill in its 
current form . . . .”).  
   These developments coincided with an announcement that Senator John McCain (R. 
Ariz.), whose vote was likely to be decisive, had suffered a rare brain cancer requiring surgery.  
Noam N. Levey & Lisa Mascaro, With Pence Breaking a Tie, Senate Votes to Begin Debate on Obamac-
are Repeal Bill, L.A. TIMES (July 25, 2017), http://www.latimes.com/politics/la-na-pol-
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tion of graduate or professional training.  In effect, we have seen a doubling 
through four- or five-year increments—thirteen, eighteen, twenty-two, and 
twenty-six—of a once-accepted age of maturity.132 
TABLE 4 
SHIFTING DIVISION ALONG A SINGLE DIMENSION 





13                       18                       22                        26 
 
The single dimension—young to old—accommodates the incremental 
adjustment of adulthood from ancient to modern times.133  To be sure, such 
blunt divisions might not succeed for all affected persons.  Given the pur-
pose for which the line is drawn—the ability to participate in particular re-
ligious rituals, to enter into binding contracts, to consent to sexual activity, 
to marry, to finish school, to work, to live on one’s own, to assume personal 
financial responsibility—its placement determines who can and who cannot 
lawfully engage in, or be held accountable for, the consequences of such ac-
tivities.  The rule accomplishes this sorting function even though some indi-
 
obamacare-senate-vote-20170725-story.html.  In a dramatic sequence of events, after surgery, 
McCain flew from Arizona to Washington to vote in favor the procedural maneuver to get the 
bill to the floor with the result of a tie, which Vice President Pence broke in favor of approval.  
Id.  The debates included an emotional floor speech by McCain that received great fanfare, af-
ter which he cast the decisive vote that defeated the bill.  In fact, the bill would also have failed 
had McCain not returned for the procedural vote.  For my contemporaneous account of “The 
McCain Moment,” and of why Senators Susan Collins (R. Me.) and Lisa Murkowski (R. Alas-
ka), who were more persistent in opposing skinny repeal received less limelight, see Max 
Stearns, The McCain Moment, BLINDSPOT (July 28, 2017), 
https://www.blindspotblog.us/single-post/2017/07/28/The-McCain-Moment, and Max 
Stearns, About Susan Collins and Lisa Murkowski, BLINDSPOT (July 28, 2017), 
https://www.blindspotblog.us/single-post/2017/07/28/About-Susan-Collins-and-Lisa-
Murkowski.  
132 For a recent debate relying on neuroscience to assess the child-adult line, see Laurence Steinberg, 
Adulthood: What the Brain Says About Maturity, N.Y. TIMES (May 29, 2012, 3:09 PM), 
http://www.nytimes.com/roomfordebate/2012/05/28/do-we-need-to-redefine-
adulthood/adulthood-what-the-brain-says-about-maturity (arguing that different age thresholds 
of legal maturity for different types of acts is the natural implication of the varying rates of matu-
ration of different parts of the brain). 
133 In other contexts, the relationship of age to other criteria, like competency to grant consent, 
could require a splitting of dimensions, as when considering the diminished capacity of those who 
are the very young or aged.  Id. 
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viduals sorted as children are more mature than others sorted as adults and 
vice versa.134  That is the nature of a rule. 
Dimensionality is highly relevant to evolving bodies of constitutional 
doctrine.  Degrees of invidiousness of challenged classifications or of the 
importance of claimed fundamental rights are equally subject to shifting so-
cietal understandings—and thus shifting lines along the relevant dimen-
sion—over time.  Same-sex marriage is the most obvious modern illustra-
tion.  The speed with which societal impressions on this issue have changed, 
thereby affecting dramatic legal change, has been stunning.135  A mere gen-
eration ago, one prominent liberal scholar described constitutional argu-
ments supporting same-sex marriage as “quite adventurous.”136  Indeed, 
they were, highlighting the Red Queen nature of constitutional law making.  
The case law trajectory including Romer v. Evans,137 Lawrence v. Texas,138 and 
United States v. Windsor,139 created an increasingly firm foundation for such 
challenges, leaving most observers wondering how, not if, the Supreme 
Court would find in favor of the Obergefell claimants. 
C.  On the Inevitability of Tiers 
Even sorting constitutional cases along a single dimension can generate 
complexity.  To illustrate, imagine how Justice Stevens’s proposed regime—a 
single meaningful tier for all cases arising under the Equal Protection 
Clause—would operate in practice.  Justice Stevens long maintained that 
equal protection demands that laws operate consistently with a regime that 
 
134 For example, in Miller v. Alabama, 132 S. Ct. 2455, 2460 (2012), the Supreme Court extended 
Roper v. Simmons, 543 U.S. 551, 578 (2005), which disallowed the death penalty for juveniles, to 
further disallow mandatory life without parole for juveniles, acknowledging that some below age 
eighteen have sufficient cognitive awareness to comprehend the gravity of their offenses, whereas 
others above eighteen may not. 
135 President Obama’s “evolution” presents a good example.  See Jackie Calmes & Peter Baker, 
Obama Says Same-Sex Marriage Should Be Legal, N.Y. TIMES (May 9, 2012), 
http://www.nytimes.com/2012/05/10/us/politics/obama-says-same-sex-marriage-should-be-
legal.html (describing President Obama’s endorsement of same-sex marriage and characterizing 
it as a “transformation on the issue”). 
136 See Cass R. Sunstein, Homosexuality and the Constitution, 70 IND. L.J. 1, 26 (1994) (“[T]he argument I 
have explored here—for the proposition that same-sex relations and even same-sex marriages 
may not be banned consistently with the Equal Protection Clause—is, to say the least, quite ad-
venturous.”). 
137 517 U.S. 620, 635–36 (1996) (holding that a Colorado law that singled out homosexuals as a class 
for unequal treatment was forbidden by the Equal Protection Clause). 
138 539 U.S. 558, 562, 578 (2003) (holding that a Texas law criminalizing same-sex private consen-
sual intimate conduct violated protected liberty interests under the Due Process Clause and was 
thus unconstitutional). 
139 133 S. Ct. 2675, 2682 (2013) (holding that the Defense of Marriage Act unconstitutionally dis-
criminated against same-sex couples married under their states’ laws). 
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governs impartially.140  Although impartiality is an appealing conception, ap-
plying it in actual cases can test constitutional doctrine in unanticipated ways. 
From the perspective of lower federal and state courts, a single tier iden-
tifies an analytical dimension along which a line demarcating permissibility 
and impermissibility will eventually be drawn.  The Supreme Court does 
not typically seek out a precise dividing line within any given case.141  Ra-
ther, over myriad cases, the Court identifies particular features that result in 
each challenged law being sustained or struck down.  Lower courts careful-
ly read these cases for guidance.  Eventually those courts will come to asso-
ciate certain descriptors as signaling a presumptively problematic law, and 
others as signaling a presumptively non-problematic law.  Because of the 
inevitably dynamic responses, most notably by legislatures or other law-
makers, to the Court’s pronouncements, a set of proxies emerges that in-
form the initial sorting.  Over time, as lawmakers seek to avoid adverse 
characterizations based on the Court’s pronouncements that prevent them 
from accomplishing certain objectives, the Court identifies other rules that 
allow a search for errors missed in the initial sort. 
Eventually as characterizations solidify, some come to be associated with 
presumptively bad, and others with presumptively good, laws.  Those respec-
tive groupings fall on opposite sides of what inevitably becomes a de facto di-
viding line.  Along the relevant analytical dimension, the dividing line sorts 
characterizations associated with invidious versus non-invidious classifica-
tions, and sorts characterizations associated with fundamental rights versus 
mere liberty interests.  Once again, the analysis is not changed by the fact 
that the precise location of that line is unknown or might change over time. 
Justice Thurgood Marshall’s contrary approach, applying multiple tiers 
of scrutiny based on the degree of invidiousness of the challenged classifica-
tion or the relative importance of the claimed right, is subject to the same 
analytical difficulty.142  Each approach—one standard or many—suffers 
from a category mistake.  The appropriate number of tiers must correlate 
with the dimensionality of the case law, not with the number of cases or case 
categories being sorted.143  Within any case law category, as precedents ac-
 
140 See Craig v. Boren, 429 U.S. 190, 211 (1976) (Stevens, J., concurring) (“There is only one Equal 
Protection Clause.  It requires every State to govern impartially.”).  Cass Sunstein has suggested 
more generally that the Constitution embraces a principle of impartiality.  CASS R. SUNSTEIN, 
THE PARTIAL CONSTITUTION 24 (1993). 
141 Indeed, such efforts might constitute dictum.  See generally Michael Abramowicz & Maxwell 
Stearns, Defining Dicta, 57 STAN. L. REV. 953 (2005). 
142 San Antonio Indep. Sch. Dist. v. Rodriguez, 411 U.S. 1, 98–99 (1973) (Marshall, J., dissenting) 
(discussing a “spectrum of standards” in equal protection cases). 
143 This follows from the insight that a single dimension can sort infinite data such as “odds or 
evens,” or “primes or non-primes,” provided the relevant sorting criterion correlates to what the 
dimension captures, and yet a single dimension cannot capture even three data—such as the se-
quence 2, 3, 4—if the relevant criteria, such as combining odds/evens and primes/non-primes, 
thwart either single dimension.  See supra Part II.A. 
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cumulate, lower courts will realize which of the several tiers result in classify-
ing the challenged law as presumptively bad or presumptively good, and 
which factors justify further inquiry, leading to a potential opposite result 
from that predicted by the initial sort.144  Whether starting with one or many 
tiers, the Court will eventually achieve two presumptive tiers, albeit with dif-
ferent terminology, and until the signals sort themselves out, less guidance. 
Justice Kennedy’s most recent decisions affecting sexual minorities are 
subject to the same analysis.  Although he avoided ascribing a specific tier 
in Lawrence v. Texas,145 and avoided the language of tiers altogether in Oberge-
fell v. Hodges,146 the holdings reveal that the challenged laws fall on the pro-
hibited side of the relevant dimension along which such cases are inevitably 
assessed.147  Future cases will reveal which, if any, laws affecting sexual mi-
norities will fall instead on the permitted side of the same analytical dimen-
sion.148  Avoiding a discussion of tiers cannot eliminate the inevitability of 
dimensionality in assessing the case law, a feature that necessarily results in 
a set of tiers-like doctrines.149 
D.  Third Tier as Splitting the Difference 
The preceding analysis further demonstrates the analytical difficulty of 
the third tier.  If intermediate scrutiny provides a means of avoiding diffi-
cult sorting decisions, the effect is temporary.  The same set of difficulties 
that confront the Marshall-Stevens-Kennedy approach to tiers inevitably 
confronts the middle tier.150  We know that cases involving gender classifi-
cations are not automatically placed in the bin for presumptively bad or 
presumptively good laws.  What we do not know is which challenged gen-
der-based laws are presumptively bad or presumptively good.  Avoiding an 
immediate answer does not mean avoiding an eventual answer. 
Over time, the Court will attach characterizations to those cases that 
are, in fact, presumptively bad (associated with “overbroad generalizations” 
or “old fogyism”) or presumptively good (associated with “real-sex differ-
ences” and making up for past adverse treatment of women).  Ironically, 
given the context, once the intermediate scrutiny fig leaf is lifted, the true 
 
144 This follows from Bayes theorem.  See generally Steven C. Salop, Evaluating Uncertain Evidence with Sir 
Thomas Bayes: A Note for Teachers, 1 J. ECON. PERSP. 155 (1987). 
145 539 U.S. 558 (2003). 
146 135 S. Ct. 2584 (2015). 
147 See infra Part III.C. (explaining that the prohibited side of the relevant analytical dimension is an-
ti-subordination). 
148 For example, we might imagine an unsuccessful equal protection challenge to a law providing 
sexual minorities, as past victims of discrimination, special consideration in hiring in particular 
employment contexts. 
149 For a more detailed analysis, see infra Part III.C. 
150 This is also true more generally of proposals for single-tier systems.  See supra Part I.D. (describing 
proposed alternative systems of tiers of scrutiny, including a single meaningful tier). 
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gender dimorphism is revealed.  Intermediate scrutiny lite becomes de facto 
rational basis review, and intermediate scrutiny heavy becomes de facto 
strict scrutiny.  The so-called middle standard is doing no work in the con-
text of gender classifications because if its purpose is to serve as a place-
holder for tough eventual decisions, there is no work for it to do.151 
Of course this does not mean that the two-tier system or the lines drawn 
along the dimensions that such systems implicate invariably succeed.  But it 
does mean that a third tier must be justified by something other than pre-
sent uncertainty.  That “something” involves dimensionality, and this anal-
ysis returns us to race. 
E.  Expanded Dimensionality and the Benign Use of Race 
Justice Brennan long advocated applying intermediate scrutiny in cases 
challenging the so-called benign use of race, meaning cases in which the 
challenged racial classification was intended to provide a benefit to identi-
fied racial minorities.  For a short time, from Metro Broadcasting through 
Adarand, he succeeded for federal racial preferences.152  Eventually, the 
Court reverted to the traditional two-tier scheme—strict or rational basis 
review—in race cases.  Because the scheme conflates dimensions, the seem-
ing simplification has had the opposite effect.  Table 5 illustrates the con-
ceptual difficulty. 
TABLE 5  
RACE AND DIMENSIONALITY 
 
Condoning benign 
 use of race 
Not condoning be-
nign use of race 
Condoning adverse use of race  Jim Crow 
Not condoning adverse use of race Modern Liberal Color-blind 
 
The vertical dimension involves the binary choice whether or not to 
condone the adverse use of race, meaning reliance on race in a manner that 
benefits whites as a class and harms blacks as a class.  The horizontal di-
mension involves the separate binary choice whether or not to condone the 
benign use of race, meaning laws designed to benefit blacks as a class at the 
expense of whites or other non-recognized minorities as a class.  Within 
Table 5, “adverse” and “benign” are defined from the perspective of histor-
 
151 In contexts in which the goal is not to place data on either side of a binary permissibility line, 
there is often a demand for intermediate categories.  Thus, for example, commodities such as 
medicines, prescription lenses, and clothing are measured in precise increments. 
152 For a review of the case history, see infra Part I.C.1. 
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ical victims of race-conscious discriminatory laws. 
The scheme has been simplified with two binary choices even though 
laws affecting race have historically reflected a spectrum and even though 
the line of permissibility has shifted over time.  Our country has moved 
from permitting ownership of chattel slaves to permitting virtually any seg-
regation to permitting segregation other than in public schools to permit-
ting no formal segregation to grappling with the reality that race-neutral 
laws often affect race-specific outcomes.153  And of course one could add 
several gradations in between. 
For purposes of the vertical dimension—condoning or not condoning 
adverse use of race—the critical issue is not where the line is drawn at any 
one time, but rather, it is the inevitability of drawing a line.  In the modern 
era, the line has been drawn so as to exclude all racial classifications that 
harm African Americans in terms along with facially neutral laws that harm 
African Americans in purpose and effect.  The earlier historical position 
from which the present line has moved was, of course, Jim Crow.  That re-
gime condoned express racial classifications operating to the benefit of 
whites and to the detriment of blacks based on accepted societal, or domi-
nant white, understandings concerning the appropriate relationships be-
tween the races. 
Long before tiers of scrutiny were formalized,154 the color-blind under-
standing of equal protection implicitly assumed that laws affecting race 
rested along a single dimension.  Against the backdrop of laws counte-
nanced by Jim Crow, the color-blind view of equal protection represented a 
liberal position inasmuch as it would ban adverse race-conscious laws.  This 
was the view expressed, perhaps most poignantly, in Justice Harlan’s fa-
mous dissenting opinion in Plessy v. Ferguson: 
[In] view of the Constitution, in the eye of the law, there is in this country no 
superior, dominant, ruling class of citizens.  There is no caste here.  Our Con-
stitution is color-blind, and neither knows nor tolerates classes among citizens.  
In respect of civil rights, all citizens are equal before the law.155 
The concept of a color-blind Constitution is admirable, especially in the 
historical context of the Plessy decision.  It remains so for those who em-
brace it as an ideal embedded within the Constitution.  Justice Thomas 
strongly asserted just this view in Parents Involved in Community Schools v. Seattle 
School District No. 1,156 and in his opposition to reliance on race as part of an 
effort to help blacks, he identifies himself as heir to a tradition that includes 
 
153 The 2016 Netflix documentary 13th draws an analogous trajectory from the subjugation of Afri-
can Americans through slavery to Jim Crow to mass incarceration primarily of African-American 
men.  13th (Kandoo Films & Netflix 2016). 
154 For a discussion of the history of tiers, see Part I.A. 
155 163 U.S. 537, 559 (Harlan, J., dissenting). 
156 551 U.S. 701, 748 (2007) (Thomas, J., concurring). 
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Justice Harlan.  Thus, Justice Thomas states: 
Most of the dissent’s criticisms of today’s result can be traced to its rejection of 
the colorblind Constitution.  The dissent attempts to marginalize the notion of 
a colorblind Constitution by consigning it to me and Members of today’s plu-
rality.  But I am quite comfortable in the company I keep.  My view of the 
Constitution is Justice Harlan’s view in Plessy: “Our Constitution is color-blind, 
and neither knows nor tolerates classes among citizens.”  And my view was the 
rallying cry for the lawyers who litigated Brown.157 
Justice Thomas had previously gone further, claiming “a ‘moral [and] 
constitutional equivalence,’ between laws designed to subjugate a race and 
those that distribute benefits on the basis of race in order to foster some 
current notion of equality.”158  Justice Thomas has since softened his moral-
equivalence stance, acknowledging the good intentions of Justice Breyer, 
who took an opposing position on the permissibility of elective race-
conscious integration measures in public schools.159  Justice Thomas’s ulti-
mate position on this question is less important than the merits of the sub-
stantive analysis contained in the longer Parents Involved quotation.  The 
analysis returns us to the problem of dimensionality.160 
Justice Harlan expressed his view in a specific historical context.  The 
context reflected the then-dominant understanding that the relevant spec-
trum along which racial laws were assessed involved possible limitations on 
a state’s power to use race in a manner perpetuating the status and interests 
of the dominant white race.  In the Plessy era, the prevalent understanding 
condoned express reliance on race to perpetuate a racial caste, consistent 
with then-dominant cultural mores.  So long as the enacting legislature had 
a rational justification in support of the law—otherwise, it would presuma-
 
157 Id. at 772 (citations omitted). 
158 Adarand Constructors, Inc. v. Pena, 515 U.S. 200, 240 (1995) (Thomas, J., concurring in part 
and concurring in the judgment) (alteration in original) (internal citation omitted). 
159 Parents Involved, 551 U.S. at 781 n.30 (Thomas, J., concurring) (“Justice Breyer’s good intentions, 
which I do not doubt, have the shelf life of Justice Breyer’s tenure.”).  Justice Thomas later posit-
ed: “There is no principled distinction between the University’s assertion that diversity yields ed-
ucational benefits and the segregationists’ assertion that segregation yielded those same benefits.”  
Fisher v. Univ. of Tex. at Austin, 133 S. Ct. 2411, 2428 (2013) (Thomas, J., concurring).  Assum-
ing that what makes those who condone race-conscious affirmative action morally equivalent to 
those condoning Jim Crow is (1) the willing acceptance of race-conscious policies that have (2) the 
purpose and effect of harming African Americans, the parenthetical quotation is in tension with 
Justice Thomas’s earlier moral-equivalence stance. In acknowledging Justice Breyer’s good faith 
in Parents Involved, Justice Thomas implies that Justice Breyer, along with the other dissenters, does 
not seek to harm, but rather seeks to help, blacks, even if he disagrees on the merits of the under-
lying policies in question. 
160 There is, in addition, a contestable factual premises embedded in Justice Thomas’s analysis.  
Whereas Justice Thomas claims that the Brown litigants embraced Justice Harlan’s color-blind vi-
sion, historians have demonstrated that color blindness was part of a larger strategy that freely 
combined elements of anti-classification and of anti-subordination, and that the deciding justices 
did not uniformly embrace either theory.  See generally Christopher W. Schmidt, Brown and the 
Colorblind Constitution, 94 CORNELL L. REV. 203 (2008). 
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bly violate dominant social mores—the law would be sustained. 
Even Justice Brown, writing for the Plessy majority, acknowledged pos-
sible laws that might cross the permissibility line, namely those with the sole 
or dominant purpose of harassing the minority race.161  Justice Harlan, re-
lying on his color-blind reading of equal protection, drew a more restrictive 
line of permissibility.  In his view, whatever the dominant cultural norms of 
the day were, the races—more to the point, whites—had to realize that 
their fates were inextricably intertwined.  And thus, Justice Harlan asked, 
what could more powerfully prevent eventual, and indeed inevitable, race 
progress than a law boldly signaling that one race was so unfit as to be un-
suited to sit next to another on a railway coach?162 
Although the Supreme Court has nominally applied strict scrutiny while 
sustaining a limited use of race in the context of admissions in state institu-
tions of higher learning, it inevitably distorted its tiers analysis in doing so.  
In addition to relaxing the understanding of narrow tailoring so as not to 
require exhausting race-neutral alternatives that might accomplish diversity 
at the expense of the law school’s elite status, the Grutter majority afforded 
unprecedented deference to the law school’s asserted desire to eventually 
bring to a close its reliance on race-advertent admissions.163  The Grutter 
majority accepted the law school’s claimed holistic daily monitoring, which 
functionally replicated the Gratz Court’s rejected point-driven algorithm.164 
This might help to explain why in Fisher I, Justice Kennedy claimed that 
as applied to the University of Texas, the Grutter version of strict scrutiny 
appeared “feeble in fact.”165  Traditional strict scrutiny would not delegate 
to the very institution seeking to defend its race-conscious policy against an 
equal protection challenge the power to determine that its claimed interest 
was sufficiently compelling or that its chosen means were adequately tai-
lored.  In remanding Fisher I, Justice Kennedy implied that Grutter’s strict 
scrutiny framework was at war with itself. 
More surprising, perhaps, was Justice Kennedy’s apparent about-face in 
 
161 Plessy v. Ferguson, 163 U.S. 537, 549–50 (1896) (illustrating, with laws that would require blacks 
and whites to walk on opposite sides of the street, that state use of the police power must “not [be 
used] for the annoyance or oppression of a particular class.”.) 
162 Id. at 560 (Harlan, J., dissenting).  Even then, Justice Harlan was explicit that his concern was 
limited to formal legal equality; he continued to adhere to the idea that the races were destined to 
remain in a state of social inequality.  Id. at 559. 
163 See supra Part I.C.1 (discussing the Grutter decision in more detail); see also Grutter v. Bollinger, 539 
U.S. 306, 339 (2003) (“Narrow tailoring does not require exhaustion of every conceivable race-
neutral alternative.  Nor does it require a university to choose between maintaining a reputation 
for excellence or fulfilling a commitment to provide educational opportunities to members of all 
racial groups.”); id. at 343 (“We take the Law School at its word that it would ‘like nothing better 
than to find a race-neutral admissions formula’ and will terminate its race-conscious admissions 
program as soon as practicable.”). 
164  See supra Part I.C.1. 
165 Fisher v. Univ. of Tex. at Austin, 133 S. Ct. 2411, 2421 (2013). 
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Fisher II.166  Justice Elena Kagan had recused herself in both Fisher I and Fisher 
II,167 and by the time Fisher II was decided, Justice Scalia had passed away,168 
leaving seven justices to decide the case.  Justice Kennedy emerged the pivot-
al justice on the seven-member Court, which would decide whether affirma-
tive action would be jettisoned or retained.169  As the median justice, joining 
Justices Breyer, Sotomayor, and Ginsburg in voting to uphold the Texas 
plan, and with Chief Justice Roberts and Justices Thomas and Alito voting to 
strike it down, Justice Kennedy revealed himself as unwilling to end race-
based affirmative action in higher education.  Justice Kennedy thus sustained 
the Texas plan even though in doing so, he condoned the very deferential 
strict scrutiny analysis of race that he had deemed feeble in Fisher I. 
Table 5 exposes the analytical difficulty in using strict scrutiny to ac-
complish the Bakke, Grutter, and Fisher II results as a problem of dimensional-
ity.  Benign race-conscious programs, specifically affirmative action, occupy 
the lower left box, whereas adverse race-conscious laws, namely Jim Crow, 
occupy the upper right box, within a two-dimensional issue space.  In a 
world in which relevant laws rested along a single dimension, with laws 
harming minorities at one end and race-neutral laws at the opposite end, 
Harlan’s color-blind Constitution is not merely apt—it is comprehensive.170  
 
166 See Fisher v. Univ. of Tex. at Austin, 136 S. Ct. 2198, 2212 (2016) (“Though a college must con-
tinually reassess its need for race-conscious review, here that assessment appears to have been 
done with care . . . .”).  For a more detailed analysis, see infra Part II.F.2. 
167 See Lyle Denniston, Argument Preview: What’s at Issue in the Fisher Case This Time?, SCOTUSBLOG 
(Dec. 2, 2015, 12:39 AM), http://www.scotusblog.com/2015/12/argument-preview-whats-at-
issue-in-the-fisher-case-this-time/ (reporting that Justice Kagan had to recuse herself from both 
Fisher decisions due to “her role in the government’s part in the case” while serving as U.S. Solici-
tor General). 
168 See Adam Liptak, Antonin Scalia, Justice on the Supreme Court, Dies at 79, N.Y. TIMES (Feb. 13, 2016), 
http://www.nytimes.com/2016/02/14/us/antonin-scalia-death.html?_r=0 (reporting on Justice 
Scalia’s death). 
169 A majority of four on a seven-member Supreme Court is treated as binding precedent.  See 28 
U.S.C. § 1 (2006) (“The Supreme Court of the United States shall consist of a Chief Justice of the 
United States and eight associate justices, any six of whom shall constitute a quorum.”); Mitchell 
v. W. T. Grant Co., 416 U.S. 600, 615 (1974) (affording binding status to Fuentes v. Shevin, 407 
U.S. 67 (1972), a 4-3 decision in which Justices Powell and Rehnquist abstained); see also Jonathan 
Remy Nash, The Majority That Wasn’t: Stare Decisis, Majority Rule, and the Mischief of Quorum Require-
ments, 58 EMORY L.J. 831, 834–35 (2009) (discussing historical instances of a four-Justice majority 
in the Supreme Court). 
170 Locating benign racial preferences before the modern era is fraught.  Some post-Civil War laws 
benefitted blacks based on specific statuses, notably as former slaves or dependent widows, as op-
posed to based on race (thus also benefitting some whites).  See Ira C. Colby, The Freedmen’s Bureau: 
From Social Welfare to Segregation, 46 PHYLON 219, 219 (1985) (noting that historians debate the 
reputability of the Freeman’s Bureau’s attempts to better the positions of freedmen because of its 
support of segregationist policies).  Justice Thomas rested on this very distinction in Parents Involved 
in Community Schools v. Seattle School District No. 1, 551 U.S. 701, 772 n.19 (2007) (Thomas, J., con-
curring) (“What the dissent fails to understand . . . is that the colorblind Constitution does not bar 
the government from taking measures to remedy past state-sponsored discrimination—indeed, it 
requires that such measures be taken in certain circumstances.  Race-based government 
measures during the 1860’s and 1870’s to remedy state-enforced slavery were therefore not incon-
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In that world, wherever the eventual line is drawn along the single dimen-
sion—harmful race-conscious laws to race-neutral laws—color blindness 
represents the minority-protecting position; conversely, along that same 
dimension, a regime that condones race advertence is decidedly illiberal.  
And yet, introducing benign race-advertent laws, the constitutional equiva-
lent of an aloft hot air balloon, forces a dimensionality split. 
The terms “adverse” or “benign” require clarification.  Justice Thomas 
claims all use of race is inherently problematic such that he rejects labeling 
any such use as benign.171  This posit, however, does not eliminate the sep-
arate analytical dimensions respecting race depicted in Table 5.  To see 
why, we must consider why race is widely condemned as a permissible basis 
for legal categorization. 
All laws draw lines along some analytical dimension, thereby defining 
which activity is or is not permitted to particular classes of individuals.  The 
analytical dimension along which the classifications are drawn, in either a 
binary or spectral fashion, can involve quite literally anything: sex, height, 
weight, wealth, IQ, willingness to pay, ability to perform a given task, or 
completion of degrees or other formal training.  As an historical matter, 
classifications have also included race.  Why has race almost exclusively 
been taken off the table? 
It will not do to suggest that of all the potential bases for classification in 
the world (those listed above plus countless others), only skin color or other 
racial characteristics are sacrosanct.  It also cannot be because race is never 
plausibly relevant, which is all that would be required if race were subject to 
rational basis scrutiny.  Rather, throughout most of history—not merely in 
the United States—empowered groups have used race to acquire and 
 
sistent with the colorblind Constitution.”) (emphasis in original) (internal citation omitted).  Other 
post-Civil War laws targeted destitute blacks as a class.  See Jed Rubenfeld, Affirmative Action, 107 
YALE L.J. 427, 430–33 (1997) (citing and describing statutes which were designed to provide fi-
nancial support only to “destitute ‘colored’ persons”); Mark A. Graber, The Second Freedmen’s Bureau 
Bill’s Constitution, 94 TEX. L. REV. 1361, 1397 (2016).  These laws operated in parallel with laws 
benefiting destitute whites, see id. at 431 n.23, and thus employed race for administrability pur-
poses, not as an early counterpart to modern benign race-based preferences.   
 Even so, Table 5 does not necessarily preclude the benign use of race during the Jim Crow 
era, which is why it frames the dimensions in terms of which practices are or are not condoned.  
Consider the combined effect of laws that are or are not condoned along each separate dimen-
sion.  During Jim Crow, the dominant (illiberal) understanding condoned a regime in which the 
only race-specific laws were adverse to blacks (thus lacking benign race-based laws); the color 
blindness position failed to condone any race-based laws on the understanding that all such laws 
were detrimental to blacks; and the modern liberal position condones benign race-based laws but 
not adverse race-based laws.  In this reading, each camp believes that its combined views are 
consistent with equal protection even if each separate component is not specifically compelled.  
And each camp holds a contrary view respecting the permissibility of at least one, and possibly 
both, of the alternative combinations. 
171 See supra notes 156–59 and accompanying text. 
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maintain privilege, often through brute force, at the expense of other 
groups.  The historical problem is reliance on race to entrench dominant 
power structures at the expense of disadvantaged minorities and sometimes 
out-of-power majorities.172 
Simply put, the historical use of race has almost always been adverse, 
often severely, to out-of-power groups, and in the United States, that has 
most notably included African Americans.  Race is not off-limits because it 
has randomly been plucked for exclusion.  Rather, race has been excluded 
because historically race has been employed adversely to minorities.  For 
some, this alone is sufficient to ban its use altogether.  That position, how-
ever, does not contradict characterizing some intended uses of race as ad-
verse, and others as benign.  And most importantly, these characterizations 
do not depend on the wisdom or efficacy of the policies under review.173 
The fact that the category “race” is excluded due to its adverse histori-
cal treatment of blacks means that it has been used to benefit those in pow-
er.  This necessarily implies that racial classifications can be structured in 
reverse, seeking to help those who have been historically subordinated due 
to race, with a cost borne by those who have been historically dominant.  
Table 5 labels this the benign use of race.174 
Table 5 reveals a true dimensionality problem.  Although the Jim Crow 
and modern liberal positions embrace opposing positions on each of the 
two critical questions—(1) condoning or not condoning adverse use of race, 
and (2) condoning or not condoning benign use of race—unlike the color-
blind camp, each condones some use of race.  Color blindness might ap-
pear to offer a partial victory to each side.  Those embracing color blind-
ness join modern liberals, who would not condone the adverse use of race.  
They also join Jim Crow, which did not condone benign use of race.  De-
spite this, because these combined positions implicate more than a single 
dimension, color blindness does not occupy a middle ground between the 
modern liberal and Jim Crow positions. 
 
172 Consider, for example, apartheid-era South Africa.  Christopher A. Ford, Challenges and Dilemmas 
of Racial and Ethnic Identity in American and Post-Apartheid South African Affirmative Action, 43 UCLA L. 
REV. 1953, 1956–57 (1996) (noting that “approximately eighty-seven percent of the population was 
disadvantaged by formal race classification during the decades of apartheid: the country’s 29.26 
million Africans, 3.08 million mixed-race ‘Coloureds,’ and 1.16 million persons of Indian de-
scent.”) (footnotes omitted). 
173 Just as it would be mistaken to label an adverse racial policy benign because it fortuitously pro-
duces a beneficial result for some minorities, so too it would be mistaken to label a benign result 
adverse because it sometimes produces the opposite effect. 
174 The term “benign” might also appear objectionable on the ground that policies benefiting minor-
ities based on race impose costs on non-minorities based on race.  For consistency, reframing 
from the perspective of the non-minority race requires flipping the words “benign” and “adverse” 
along both dimensions.  This produces the same dimensionality problem, albeit with reversed la-
bels. 
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F.  Dimensionality, Cycling, and Multicriterial Decision Making 
The presentation that follows lays the analytical foundation for a critical 
insight: as applied to race, the problem of dimensionality can persist even 
though only two of the three positions that generate it are presently occu-
pied.  More generally, dimensionality and the related phenomenon of cy-
cling can arise even if one of the contributing historical positions has been 
abandoned.  That is because present positions are influenced by abandoned 
past positions, which combine to effect multicriterial decision making.  Alt-
hough modern liberals and those embracing a color-blind view abhor Jim 
Crow, these current positions remain influenced by that discredited position 
because each draws different lessons—and generates different rules—in re-
sponse to past mistakes associated with Jim Crow.  The remaining discus-
sion in this subpart, which is somewhat technical, provides the analytical 
tools that explain this insight, thus strengthening the analysis of how dimen-
sionality has affected affirmative action, same-sex marriage, and other 
equal protection doctrines.175 
1.  Cycling and the Condorcet Paradox 
The analysis begins with three individuals (P1, P2, and P3) holding the 
following ordinal preferences over options ABC: P1: ABC, P2: BCA, P3: 
CAB.  Assume that each person holds internally transitive orderings, mean-
ing that P1 not only prefers A to B to C, but also A to C; P2 not only pre-
fers B to C to A, but also C to A; and so on.  Because this group has no first 
choice majority candidate, a plausible way of working this through would 
be to take binary comparisons (A versus B, B versus C, etc.) hoping that a 
consensus candidate emerges.  With the listed preferences, however, the 
group will instead discover that P1 and P2 prefer B to C, P2 and P3 prefer 
C to A, and yet with one more iteration, P1 and P3 prefer A to B.  The re-
sult is a cycle in which the group prefers A to B and B to C, but C to A. 
The cycle is not inevitable.  If we slightly modify P3’s preferences so that 
she ranks her preferences CBA rather than CAB, although there is still no 
first-choice winner, a stable outcome emerges.  A regime of binary compar-
isons reveals that P1 and P2 prefer B to C, and P2 and P3 prefer B to A.  
This time, a final comparison, between A and C, is beside the point.  Alt-
hough P2 and P3 prefer C to A, B defeats either alternative in direct com-
parisons.  In social choice theory, option B, the option that defeats all oth-
ers in direct comparisons, is known as a Condorcet winner.176 
 
175 Those wishing to avoid the technical presentation can rest on the preceding summary, and con-
tinue with Part II.F.2. 
176 For a general discussion, see Maxwell L. Stearns, The Misguided Renaissance of Social Choice, 103 
YALE. L.J. 1219 (1994). 
1082 JOURNAL OF CONSTITUTIONAL LAW [Vol. 19:5 
Although Condorcet winners and rules capable of generating them 
when they are available are often viewed favorably, such rules carry im-
portant limitations.  When there is no Condorcet winner and when the in-
stitution must generate an outcome, rules ensuring that Condorcet winners 
prevail risk cycling instead of producing an outcome.  Cycling need not im-
ply endless indeterminacy.  It might mean no more than that the chosen 
outcome was arbitrary in the sense that it was heavily influenced by the or-
der of decisions, such that a different voting protocol might have yielded a 
different outcome.177  In addition, the Condorcet criterion only allows the 
expression of ordinal rankings; it does not permit participants to register 
how intensely they feel about particular options. 
Dimensionality is the condition that generates cycling preferences.  Di-
mensionality implies a cycle in that it creates the conditions from which, 
with plausible assumptions,178 one might infer cycling preferences.  When 
dimensionality arises, those who resolve the identified issues along each 
separate dimension in opposite fashion nonetheless share some common 
value.  Those occupying the lower left and upper right positions in Table 5 
resolve in opposite fashion whether or not to condone (1) the adverse use of 
race and (2) the benign use of race.  Despite that, these two groups each 
condone some use of race.  By contrast, those in the lower right appear to 
provide a partial victory to each other camp (not condoning adverse use of 
race, favoring modern liberals, and not condoning benign use of race, fa-
voring Jim Crow), yet thwart the common willingness of the remaining 
groups to condone some use of race. 
Although the details of the possible cycles are unimportant, each rests 
on at least one contestable assumption.  Here the assumption is that either 
the Jim Crow or modern liberal positions might rank each other ahead of 
color blindness to secure the lawful permissiveness of relying on race, hop-
ing to defeat what each regards as the disfavored use of race politically.179 
 
177 Cycling rests at the core of another social choice insight, namely Arrow’s Impossibility Theorem, 
or simply Arrow’s Theorem.  Arrow proved that any set of rules designed to avoid cycling when 
transforming member inputs into collective outputs will necessarily violate one of several condi-
tions that he considered essential to fair group decision making.  For a detailed discussion, see 
STEARNS, supra note 44, at 81–94. 
178 Plausible does not mean irrefutable; cycles are often constructed with alternative sets of contesta-
ble, yet plausible, assumptions.  For an illustration, see infra note 179. 
179 Based on Table 5, we can construct either of two theoretical cycles over these three positions, (A) 
Modern liberal, (B) Jim Crow, and (C) Color-blind.  For a forward cycle, assume that modern 
liberals believe that they can defeat adverse race-conscious laws politically, but fear a rule alto-
gether banning benign race-conscious laws.  If so their preferences are ABC.  The positions al-
lowing Jim Crow to rank BCA, and color-blind to rank CAB, are intuitive, and together generate 
a cycle ApBpCpA where p means preferred by simple majority rule and each preference is based 
on binary comparisons.  To generate a reverse cycle, assume that the Jim Crow camp believes it 
can defeat benign race-conscious measures politically, but fears the inability to pass adverse ones 
(CBA); that the color-blind camp is more fearful of benign race-preferences, which are likely to 
endure, than adverse ones, which they believe are sufficiently reprehensible that they will soon be 
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Dimensionality, and cycling, arises not only from positions people hold 
over choices, but also from background rules or conceptual framings that 
affect those choices.  In multicriterial decision making, background rules 
combine with present options to forge dimensionality.  Although all three 
identified positions in Table 5 were once accepted as legitimate, at any giv-
en time, no more than two were viewed as dominant or creditworthy.  Dur-
ing the Jim Crow era, the two dominant positions were Jim Crow and color 
blindness.  Today, with Jim Crow thankfully discredited, only color blind-
ness and the modern liberal position are creditworthy. 
Recall that with preferences P1: ABC, P2: BCA, P3: CAB, the group 
will discover a cycle such that ApBpCpA, where p means preferred to by 
simple majority rule.  But even if a decision maker is removed, the cycle 
can persist due to a combination of remaining preferences and governing 
rules.  Rules extend the preferences of past participants to the decision-
making process.  Indeed, rules are the formal extension past decision mak-
ers’ preferences. 
If P3 plans to retire, she might encourage P1 and P2 to embrace a rule 
that captures all or part of her preferences.  Imagine the proposed rule pro-
vides that when choosing either between B and C or between B and A, P3’s 
preferences, which least favor B, must be credited.  The rule would discour-
age either P1 or P2, working with P3’s replacement, P4, from enacting ei-
ther of their last choices.180  When combined with the ordinal preferences of 
P1 and P2, the P3 rule replicates the earlier forward cycle.181  Although cy-
cling is often viewed unfavorably, a cycle might be preferable to the risk that 
P4 will team up with either P1 or P2 to produce P3’s least preferred result.182 
 
politically defeated (BCA); and that the modern liberals intuitively prefer color blindness to Jim 
Crow (ACB).  The result is a reverse cycle CpBpApC.  Notably, each ranking includes both 
available orderings for each camp over the remaining options. 
180 For a fascinating study of multicriterial decision making, see LEO KATZ, WHY THE LAW IS SO 
PERVERSE 25–31 (2011).  In a fanciful illustration, Katz demonstrates how competing rules of 
triage and free exchange (the Pareto principle) can create a confounding cycle for a physician 
with time to treat only one of three patients involved in an automobile crash: one member of a 
married couple, Al and Chloe, with Al suffering a relatively severe, and Chloe, a relatively minor, 
injury, and another woman, Bea, with a moderate injury.  If Al and Chloe prioritize Chloe’s 
treatment over Al’s, then under the Pareto principle, Chloe is treated first.  Under triage, Bea 
takes priority over Chloe.  And under triage again, Al takes priority over Bea.  Then under Pare-
to, Chloe regains priority.  This combination generates a treatment cycle: Chloe p Al p Bea p 
Chloe, where p means preferred to under the conflicting multicriterial decision making of triage 
and Pareto.  This holds even if only a subset of patients participates in the formal decision making 
at a given time. 
181 This further explains the parallel logic of Arrow’s Theorem and multicriterial decision making.  
For a discussion of multicriterial decision making, see Matthew L. Spitzer, Multicriteria Choice Pro-
cesses: An Application of Public Choice Theory to Bakke, the FCC, and the Courts, 88 YALE L.J. 717, 719–
20 (1979).  For a discussion of Arrow’s Theorem, see STEARNS, supra note 44, at 81–94. 
182 Thus, whereas Donald Saari ascribes cycling to the “curse of dimensionality,” depending on the 
threatened outcome, some might instead regard dimensionality, and the resulting cycle, as a 
blessing.  DONALD G. SAARI, DISPOSING DICTATORS, DEMYSTIFYING VOTING PARADOXES: 
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This dynamic can arise when present jurists frame equal protection op-
tions based upon conflicting understandings of discredited positions from 
the past.  Modern liberals infer from Jim Crow the need to avoid racial 
subordination even if doing so means condoning occasional reliance on 
race to benefit a once subordinated group.  Color-blinds infer from Jim 
Crow that regardless of how it is characterized, any reliance on race is 
harmful and must be prohibited.  Despite its general condemnation, Jim 
Crow has forged ongoing multicriterial decision making. 
2.  Multicriterial Decision Making and the Complexity of Race: Fisher I and 
Fisher II Revisited 
Multicriterial decision making helps to explain the complexity of our 
race jurisprudence.  At the time that Harlan issued his Plessy dissent, race-
based laws were obviously not intended to advance the interests of African 
Americans.183  Justice Harlan’s color-blind Constitution operated against 
the backdrop of Jim Crow, a regime in which the universe of race-advertent 
laws perpetuated a racial caste system operating to the detriment of blacks. 
Table 5 exposes how the relationship between the color-blind Constitu-
tion and race is shaped by dimensionality.  Increased racial sensitivity has 
placed stress on where the line should be drawn as to which legal policies 
affecting race are or are not permitted.  It is widely accepted that laws ex-
pressly relying on race to the detriment of blacks, and laws with the purpose 
and effect of harming blacks, are presumed invalid and will be struck down.  
Uncertainty concerning that line’s precise location, or the possibility of its 
shift over time, does not remove the inevitable binary sorting along the ver-
tical dimension in Table 5. 
The horizontal dimension in Table 5 depicts the more recent analytical 
category of race-specific laws designed to benefit African Americans.  At 
first blush, the modern liberal position (lower left) appears precisely oppo-
site the discredited Jim Crow position (upper right).  The analysis of dimen-
sionality reveals why this is misleading.  Although these two groups resolve 
questions along each separate dimension in opposite fashion, they nonethe-
less hold in common condoning some use of race.  This explains why Jus-
tice Thomas accuses modern liberals, despite their intentions, of perpetuat-
ing the evils of Jim Crow.184  By contrast, the color-blind (lower right) 
position resolves partially in favor of each group, yet refuses to condone any 
 
SOCIAL CHOICE ANALYSIS 13–15 (2008) (ascribing cycling in group decision making to the “curse 
of dimensionality”).  Because preferences can cycle either forward or in reverse, the same phenome-
non can arise if P1 and P2 reject the P3 position, albeit on different normative grounds.  See supra 
note 179 (illustrating forward and reverse cycles). 
183 For a discussion of post-Civil War laws benefitting African Americans, see supra note 170, and 
cites therein. 
184 See supra note 156–59 and accompanying text. 
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use of race, including those designed to benefit African Americans. 
The discredited Jim Crow position continues to affect dimensionality, 
much like the post-retirement P3 rule.185  Although modern liberals and 
color-blinds remain influenced by its dangers, each reads the lessons of his-
tory differently and constructs different, and conflicting, rules as a result.  
Our legal doctrines work reasonably well toward challenging race-specific 
laws adversely affecting blacks along with race neutral laws with an adverse 
purpose and effect.  Such cases represent evolving choices along the dimen-
sion involving “condoning or not condoning adverse use of race.”  As with 
age, the dividing line along this single dimension has shifted over time.186  
By contrast, the scheme works less well in confronting the alternative di-
mension of “condoning or not condoning the benign use of race,” which 
like the hot air balloon or the number 2, forces a split in dimensionality. 
Ironically, by forcing consideration of all race-based laws into a single 
category, equal protection doctrine has prevented the meaningful assess-
ment of race along a single dimension with two simple tiers, rational basis 
and strict scrutiny.  If adverse and benign use of race were treated as sepa-
rate categories, a two-tiers system operating along each separate spectrum 
based on the invidiousness or other difficulties associated with the racial 
classification under review, would allow for a clean dividing line as to when 
race may or may not be used in each category.  Combining these as a single 
category of race, however, forges dimensionality and thus creates the need 
for a third tier.  And because the most obvious candidate for a third tier—
intermediate scrutiny—has been disallowed,187 the result has been to force 
a disingenuous applications of strict scrutiny in the context of race, thus 
contributing to the anomalous 14325 sequence.  In effect, we have forced 
strict scrutiny to do the work of a different analytical test, with the conse-
quence of having Category 4 (strict scrutiny lite) abut Category 1 (rational 
basis) rather than Category 5 (strict scrutiny). 
Imagine instead that the benign and adverse use of race were treated as 
separate categories, and that, as under present doctrine, some reliance on 
race is permitted.  As applied to affirmative action in higher education, for 
example, the split would place laws resembling the Harvard plan, which 
Justice Powell favored in Board of Regents of the University of California v. 
 
185 See supra Part II.F.1 (explaining cycling and dimensionality).  As a result, it becomes possible to 
construct a set of plausible, albeit contested, preferences from which to infer either a forward or 
reverse cycle.  See supra note 179 and accompanying text. 
186 See supra Part II.B (describing how the age that a child is considered to become an adult has 
changed over time).  For a counter-illustration in which age affects dimensionality, see supra note 
133. 
187 See Adarand Constructors, Inc. v. Pena, 515 U.S. 200, 227 (1995) (overturning Metro Broadcasting, 
Inc. v. FCC, 497 U.S. 547, 564-65 (1990), which had sustained benign race-based classification 
under intermediate scrutiny). 
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Bakke,188 the Michigan Law School plan sustained in Grutter v. Bollinger,189 
and now the Texas plan sustained in Fisher v. University of Texas (Fisher 
II)190—plans that do not employ formal quotas and that use race as one fac-
tor among many as part of a claimed holistic admissions process—in the 
rational basis bin for presumptively good laws.  And it would place laws like 
those struck down in Bakke and in Gratz v. Bollinger—plans that set up quo-
tas, segregate files, or award fixed points based on race—in the strict scruti-
ny bin for presumptively bad laws. 
The conflicting results in the Fisher I remand followed by the Fisher II af-
firmance highlight the analytical difficulty with the Court’s combined ap-
proach to race.  To better appreciate these cases, some background will be 
helpful.  In Hopwood v. Texas,191 the United States Court of Appeals for the 
Fifth Circuit interpreted Adarand Constructors, Inc. v. Pena,192 a case that ap-
plied strict scrutiny in the context of a race-based set-aside program for fed-
eral contracting rather than affirmative action in higher education,193 as 
demanding the application of strict scrutiny in its more traditional form for 
all race-based classifications.194  The Hopwood Court thus applied traditional 
strict scrutiny to strike down the University of Texas School of Law’s af-
firmative action plan.  The University responded by implementing an ad-
missions policy relying on holistic factors, without relying expressly on race, 
as proxies for diversity.  The state legislature responded by enacting a top 
ten-percent law, guaranteeing qualified high school graduates who met cer-
tain criteria admission to any public state college, including the University 
of Texas.  Following Grutter, which sustained the University of Michigan 
School of Law affirmative action program, and with the top ten-percent 
plan already in place, the University of Texas adopted its revised holistic 
race-conscious plan at issue in Fisher to ensure a “critical mass” of students, 
including meaningful minority classroom enrollment.195 
 
188 438 U.S. 265, 316–18 (1978). 
189 539 U.S. 306, 343–44 (2003). 
190 136 S. Ct. 2198, 2214 (2016). 
191 78 F.3d 932 (5th Cir. 1996). 
192 515 U.S. 200 (1996). 
193 See supra Part I.C.1 (discussing Adarand); see also Maxwell L. Stearns, The Case for Including Marks v. 
United States in the Canon of Constitutional Law, 17 CONST. COMMENT. 321, 334–35 (2000) (posit-
ing that Justice Scalia joined the Adarand majority opinion despite fundamental disagreements to 
create the necessary majority to overturn Metro Broadcasting, Inc. v. FCC, 497 U.S. 547 (1990)). 
194 Hopwood, 78 F.3d at 940. 
195 Fisher v. Univ. of Tex. at Austin (Fisher I), 133 S. Ct. 2411, 2415–16 (2013) (describing the history 
of race-conscious admission policies at the University of Texas at Austin leading up to the pro-
gram being challenged in Fisher I).  Justice Kennedy described the challenged program as follows: 
To implement the Proposal the University included a student’s race as a component of 
the PAI [Personal Achievement Index] score, beginning with applicants in the fall of 
2004.  The University asks students to classify themselves from among five predefined ra-
cial categories on the application.  Race is not assigned an explicit numerical value, but it 
is undisputed that race is a meaningful factor. 
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In Fisher I, Justice Kennedy, writing for a majority of seven on an eight-
member Court, explained that the combined post-Hopwood regime im-
proved overall racial diversity relative to the final year of the pre-Hopwood 
regime, with the entering class being composed of 4.5% African Americans 
and 16.9% Hispanics as compared with 4.1% African Americans and 
14.5% Hispanics.196  The combined scheme, which the Fifth Circuit sus-
tained largely based on Grutter, substantially improved minority enroll-
ment.197  Justice Kennedy explained: 
[The Fifth Circuit] held that Grutter required courts to give substantial deference 
to the University, both in the definition of the compelling interest in diversity’s 
benefits and in deciding whether its specific plan was narrowly tailored to 
achieve its stated goal.  Applying that standard, the court upheld the Universi-
ty’s admissions plan.198 
Justice Kennedy observed that although the Grutter Court had deferred 
to the Michigan Law School’s assertion that diversity was central to its edu-
cational mission, the application of strict scrutiny remained a judicial in-
quiry.  He explained: 
Narrow tailoring . . . requires that the reviewing court verify that it is “nec-
essary” for a university to use race to achieve the educational benefits of diversi-
ty.  This involves a careful judicial inquiry into whether a university could 
achieve sufficient diversity without using racial classifications.  Although 
“[n]arrow tailoring does not require exhaustion of every conceivable race-neutral 
alternative,” strict scrutiny does require a court to examine with care, and not 
defer to, a university’s “serious, good faith consideration of workable race-
neutral alternatives.”  Consideration by the university is of course necessary, 
but it is not sufficient to satisfy strict scrutiny: The reviewing court must ulti-
mately be satisfied that no workable race-neutral alternatives would produce 
the educational benefits of diversity.  If “‘a nonracial approach . . . could pro-
mote the substantial interest about as well and at tolerable administrative ex-
pense,’” then the university may not consider race. . . . [S]trict scrutiny imposes 
on the university the ultimate burden of demonstrating, before turning to racial 
classifications, that available, workable race-neutral alternatives do not suf-
fice.199 
 
Id. at 2416 (2013). 
196 Id. 
197 Although the Fisher I Court did not recount admissions statistics under the new plan, the Fifth 
Circuit stated: 
In an entering class that was roughly the same size in 1998 as it was in 2008, the enroll-
ment of African-American students doubled from 165 students to 335 students.  Hispanic 
enrollment increased approximately 1.5 times, from 762 students to 1,228 students.  
Asian-American enrollment also increased nearly 10%, from 1,034 students to 1,126 stu-
dents.  By contrast, in 2004, the last year the Top Ten Percent Law operated without the 
Grutter plan, fall enrollment included only 275 African Americans and 1,024 Hispanics. 
Fisher v. Univ. of Tex. at Austin, 631 F.3d 213, 226 (5th Cir. 2011) (internal citations omitted). 
198 Fisher I, 133 S. Ct. at 2417 (citation omitted). 
199 Id. at 2420 (second and third alterations in original) (citations omitted) (quoting Wygant v. Jack-
son Bd. of Educ., 476 U.S. 267, 280 n.6 (1986)) (citing Grutter v. Bollinger, 539 U.S. 306 (2003); 
Regents of the Univ. of Cal. v. Bakke, 438 U.S. 265 (1978)). 
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Justice Kennedy then explained the need for a remand: 
Rather than perform this searching examination, however, the Court of 
Appeals held petitioner could challenge only “whether [the University’s] deci-
sion to reintroduce race as a factor in admissions was made in good faith.”  And 
in considering such a challenge, the court would “presume the University acted 
in good faith” and place on petitioner the burden of rebutting that presump-
tion.200 
Perhaps the most striking feature of Fisher I is what Justice Kennedy did 
not say.  He did not suggest, as Justice Thomas had in Grutter,201 that the 
University choose either to relinquish its elite status or its racial diversity.  
And yet, he maintained that deferring to the University’s good faith judg-
ment about how to balance these competing concerns—the deference that 
Grutter afforded the University of Michigan Law School—was inconsistent 
with strict scrutiny and, in fact, risked rendering strict scrutiny “feeble in 
fact.”202  Although Justice Kennedy maintained that strict scrutiny should 
be neither fatal nor feeble, he failed to offer a meaningful alternative, other 
than implying by omission that the alternative is not intermediate scrutiny. 
Following the Fisher I remand, the Fifth Circuit once more affirmed the 
University of Texas plan against the equal protection challenge.203  When 
Fisher II returned to the Supreme Court, Justice Kennedy emerged at the 
center of a seven-member Court.204  Justice Kennedy observed that the 
record was devoid of specific details concerning students “admitted solely 
based on their class rank” as opposed to “through holistic review.”205  He 
further noted that additional fact-finding would not be productive given the 
time line: the case had been in litigation for eight years, such “evidence has 
little bearing on whether petitioner received equal treatment when her ap-
plication was rejected in 2008,” and the claimant, Abigail Fisher, had long 
since graduated.206  Rather than dismissing certiorari as improvidently 
granted or based on mootness, however, Justice Kennedy went on to reject 
the equal protection challenge to the combined Texas plan. 
Justice Kennedy maintained that the Texas legislature could not be 
faulted for enacting the ten-percent plan in the aftermath of Hopwood, given 
its then understanding of equal protection doctrine.  The greater challenge 
was justifying the combined percentage plan with the race-explicit overlay.  
Justice Kennedy emphasized that the combined impact had notably im-
 
200 Id. (alteration in original) (quoting Fisher v. Univ. of Texas at Austin, 631 F.3d 213, 231–32, 236 
(5th Cir. 2011) 
201 Grutter v. Bollinger, 539 U.S. 306, 361 (2003) (Thomas, J., concurring in part and dissenting in 
part) (“[T]he Law School should be forced to choose between its classroom aesthetic and its ex-
clusionary admissions system—it cannot have it both ways.”). 
202 Fisher I, 133 S. Ct. at 2421. 
203 Fisher v. Univ. of Texas at Austin, 758 F.3d 633, 637 (5th Cir. 2014). 
204 See supra notes 167–69 and accompanying text (describing the composition of the Fisher II Court). 
205 Fisher v. Univ. of Texas at Austin (Fisher II), 136 S. Ct. 2198, 2209 (2016). 
206 Id. 
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proved the percentage attendance of minority students, observing that the 
diversity goal involved not merely aggregate enrollments, but also specific 
classroom settings.207  Justice Kennedy rejected Ms. Fisher’s argument that 
the small incidence of reliance on race revealed it to be an unnecessary 
means of achieving diversity.208  Here, Justice Kennedy appeared to con-
tradict his own earlier analysis in Parents Involved in Community Schools v. Seattle 
School District No. 1,209 where he stated: 
[I]t is noteworthy that the number of students whose assignment depends on 
express racial classifications is limited.  I join Part III-C of the Court’s opinion 
because I agree that in the context of these plans, the small number of assign-
ments affected suggests that the schools could have achieved their stated ends 
through different means.210 
By contrast, in Fisher II, Justice Kennedy concluded: “[I]t is not a failure of 
narrow tailoring for the impact of racial consideration to be minor.  The 
fact that race consciousness played a role in only a small portion of admis-
sions decisions should be a hallmark of narrow tailoring, not evidence of 
unconstitutionality.”211 
Justice Kennedy rejected the alternative methods that Ms. Fisher sug-
gested as a means of minority outreach along with Justice Thomas’s alter-
native approach from Grutter,212 stating “Equal Protection . . . does not force 
universities to choose between a diverse student body and a reputation for 
academic excellence,”213 the very framing that led to the deferential—or 
“feeble”—approach advanced in Grutter. 
The more difficult claim involved Ms. Fisher’s argument that the uni-
versity could increase diversity through a stepped-up percentage plan as an 
alternative to express reliance on race.  In rejecting this analysis, Justice 
Kennedy avoided the virtual elephant in the room, namely the different 
types of students that the university is likely to attract through these two 
components of its combined admission regime: the percentage plan, on one 
hand, and the race-specific admissions, on the other.  Instead, Justice Ken-
nedy eschewed the issue by accepting Justice Ginsburg’s Fisher I analysis.  
Justice Kennedy stated: “As an initial matter, petitioner overlooks the fact 
that the Top Ten Percent Plan, though facially neutral, cannot be under-
stood apart from its basic purpose, which is to boost minority enrollment.  
 
207 Id. at 2212. 
208 Id. 
209 551 U.S. 701 (2007). For a more detailed analysis of Parents Involved, see supra notes 156–59 and 
accompanying text. 
210 Id.  at 790 (Kennedy, J., concurring). 
211 Fisher II, 136 S. Ct. at 2212.  I thank Peter J. Artese for bringing this to my attention. 
212 Grutter v. Bollinger, 539 U.S. 306, 361–62 (2003) (Thomas, J., concurring in part and dissenting 
in part) (positing that equal protection disallows the University of Michigan School of Law to 
couple elite admissions criteria with race-based exceptions to satisfy its twin goals of prestige and 
diversity). 
213 Fisher II, 136 S. Ct. at 2213. 
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Percentage plans are ‘adopted with racially segregated neighborhoods and 
schools front and center stage.’”214 
Justice Kennedy concluded, “petitioner cannot assert simply that in-
creasing the University’s reliance on a percentage plan would make its ad-
missions policy more race neutral.”215  He added: “Even if, as a matter of 
raw numbers, minority enrollment would increase under such a regime, pe-
titioner would be hard-pressed to find convincing support for the proposi-
tion that college admissions would be improved if they were a function of 
class rank alone.”216  Justice Kennedy closed by speculating about the poten-
tial missed applicants Ms. Fisher’s approach might entail: “a talented young 
biologist who struggled to maintain above-average grades in humanities 
classes,”217 or “a student whose freshman-year grades were poor because of 
a family crisis but who got herself back on track in the last three years of 
school, only to find herself just outside the top decile of her class.”218 
For purposes of the tiers analysis, it is important to parse two important 
attributes of Justice Kennedy’s Fisher II analysis.  First, perhaps unwittingly, 
Justice Kennedy flipped strict scrutiny on its head.  He did so by positing 
that petitioner’s argument failed because Fisher could not prove that a race-
neutral method—a stepped up percentage plan—would result in qualita-
tively better admitted students.  Of course under strict scrutiny—the old-
fashioned kind—the state has the burden to prove narrow tailoring.  Justice 
Kennedy instead has placed the burden on Ms. Fisher, the challenger, to 
prove that a more narrowly tailored program would succeed just as well.  
As we have previously seen, when the outcomes fall within a gray area, one 
that neither side can prove or disprove, the allocation of the burden of 
proof controls the outcome.219 
Second and perhaps more notably, Justice Kennedy wrote the opinion in 
a manner that avoided the real stakes of the case.  The issue here is not 
merely the raw number, or even percentage, of minority students admitted 
through the two separate parts of the combined Texas plan.  Rather, it is the 
probable different nature of the students admitted under each part.  The 
University of Texas officials were certainly well aware that the top percent-
age plan does not necessarily bring to the University of Texas, a highly elite 
institution, those students who—although falling below the ten percent 
threshold—have high stakes test scores on the SATs and ACTs that demon-
strate greater academic promise, and thus a higher likelihood of eventual 
 






219 See supra part I.A. 
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academic success.220  To allow the University to accomplish its goal of ad-
mitting these more highly qualified minority students, Justice Kennedy effec-
tively flipped the burden of proof onto the challenger, thereby extending 
deference to the University, just as he criticized the Grutter Court for having 
done in his Fisher I opinion.  In doing so, Justice Kennedy rested on the 
proposition that equal protection does not force upon the University of Tex-
as the choice of diversity or prestige.  But in allowing the University to have 
the cake it is eating, while also claiming to apply strict scrutiny, Justice Ken-
nedy reconceived that test to do the work of rational basis review.  Once 
more the result is to flip the sequence 12345 to 14325.221 
This doctrinal inversion was not inevitable.  Even if one rejects Justice 
Stevens’s claim in his Adarand Constructors, Inc. v. Pena dissent that strict scruti-
ny is unnecessary to distinguish a “No Trespassing sign” from a “welcome 
mat,”222 it is clear that those who embrace the modern liberal position are 
answering the underlying questions as to when race is or is not permitted dif-
ferently from those who once embraced Jim Crow.  If the Court acknowl-
edged this distinction, thereby aligning its tiers doctrine with the dimension-
ality of the underlying case law, the conventional two-tier approach would 
succeed, with a line separating permissible from impermissible conduct 
drawn for each case category: laws designed to benefit minorities, on one 
hand, and laws designed to subordinate them, on the other.  If, instead, all 
race cases are forced into the same doctrinal bin of strict scrutiny and yet 
some of those challenged laws are to be sustained, then we need a mecha-
nism with which to separately handle cases relying on race in opposite ways 
based on whether the challenged law seeks to benefit or to harm African 
Americans as a class.  The obvious method, limited to the category of be-
nign race-based classifications, is to allow a third tier such as intermediate 
scrutiny.  Despite the Fisher I remand, this is the inevitable lesson of Fisher II. 
Although the case law has produced related anomalies associated with 
the stricter version of rational basis scrutiny,223 the dimensionality problem 
implicating a third tier is endemic to race.  The historical role of race within 
our history and constitutional doctrine has given color blindness a distinct 
normative status that appears to lack a counterpart of sex- or sexual-
orientation-blindness.224  Whereas race implicates the two dimensions of 
antidiscrimination (using race as a basis for classification) and anti-
 
220 Fisher II, 136 S. Ct. at 2233–34 (Alito, J., dissenting) (citing the University of Texas’s arguments 
that “holistic admits” had higher SAT scores and noting that “[i]n addition to using socioeco-
nomic status to falsely denigrate the minority students admitted through the Top Ten Percent 
Plan, UT also argues that such students are academically inferior”). 
221 See supra Introduction. 
222 515 U.S. 200, 245 (1995) (Stevens, J., dissenting) (“The consistency that the Court espouses 
would disregard the difference between a ‘No Trespassing’ sign and a welcome mat.”). 
223 See supra Part I.C.2; infra Part III.C. 
224 See infra Part III.B (distinguishing color- and sex-blindness). 
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subordination (treating racial minorities disadvantageously), these other 
case law categories implicate only the anti-subordination dimension.225  
Treating race as a meta-category, thereby collapsing these dimensions and 
subjecting all race cases to strict scrutiny, has also produced a notorious 
anomaly: although the Fourteenth Amendment was designed to end 
longstanding adverse treatment of blacks at the hands of the state, the dif-
ferential standards for race and sex has allowed the Court to sustain laws 
expressly designed to benefit women but has disallowed it to sustain laws 
designed to benefit racial minorities. 
III.  THE PROBLEM OF TIERS REVISITED: RACE, GENDER, AND SEXUAL 
ORIENTATION 
This part applies the preceding analysis to several important remaining 
issues implicating race, gender, and sexual orientation, including revisiting 
the Obergefell decision. 
A.  Dimensionality and Race: Race Neutral Laws and Antisubordination 
We begin with the problem of adverse race-neutral laws and then dis-
cuss laws that although not racially discriminatory nonetheless subordinate 
based on race. 
1.  The Problem of Adverse Race-Neutral Laws 
In Washington v. Davis, the Supreme Court considered an equal protec-
tion challenge to a race-neutral English literacy exam used in hiring District 
of Columbia police officers.226  Although the policy disproportionately dis-
qualified African American applicants, the Supreme Court sustained it 
against an equal protection challenge applying rational basis scrutiny.  Writ-
ing for a majority, Justice White determined that because the program was 
motivated by the legitimate purpose of increasing the communicative skills 
in a workforce valuing such skills, the differential impact did not trigger 
heightened scrutiny.227  The Court further rejected a purpose-and-effects 
analysis, observing that the police department had refuted the claimed illicit 
purpose through its affirmative efforts to recruit minority officers.228  The 
Court applied similar reasoning in two controversial subsequent cases. 
In United States v. Armstrong, the Court rejected a claim of selective prosecu-
tion that resulted in disparate sentencing for crack cocaine, a predominantly 
 
225 See infra Part III.A.2 (distinguishing antidiscrimination and anti-subordination as related to race). 
226 426 U.S. 229, 232, 239 (1976). 
227 Id. at 245–46. 
228 Id. at 235–36. 
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black offense, versus powder cocaine, a predominantly white offense.229  
Chief Justice Rehnquist, writing for a majority, applied rational basis scruti-
ny, reasoning that all races did not commit the same offenses proportionately 
to their demographic representation.  He observed, for example, that where-
as crack cocaine is a disproportionately black offense, prostitution and child 
pornography tend to be disproportionately white offenses.230 
And in McCleskey v. Kemp, Chief Justice Rehnquist, again writing for a ma-
jority, rejected an equal protection challenge premised on the famous David 
Baldus study demonstrating the disparate application of the death sentence 
based on the races of the perpetrator and victim.231  A black murderer killing 
a white victim was more than four times as likely to receive the death penalty 
than any other combination, and overall, black defendants stood a far greater 
likelihood of receiving the death penalty than white defendants.232 
Although facially neutral, the challenged laws in Armstrong and McCleskey 
were obviously not benign in the sense of affirmatively seeking to benefit 
blacks.  Rather, the government defended these policies as furthering some 
non-racial objective in spite of the policy’s adverse racial impact.  These cas-
es illustrate another round in a Red Queen game involving: (1) race-specific 
laws harming blacks; (2) race-neutral laws with the purpose and effect of 
harming blacks; and now (3) race-neutral laws claimed to serve an inde-
pendent benign purpose, but with an adverse consequence on blacks.  Thus 
far, the Court has drawn the line along this analytical dimension placing 
Categories 1 and 2 on one side (prohibited), and Category 3 on the other 
(permitted).  Whether the resulting deference in Category 3 cases, to which 
rational basis scrutiny applies, will continue, or whether the Court will, over 
time, throw more such cases in the presumptive bad pile remains to be 
seen.  However such future cases are resolved, they do not create a dimen-
sionality problem inasmuch as the challenged laws, although racially neu-
tral, are not intended to benefit racial minorities. 
2.  The Problem of Nondiscriminatory Laws That Subordinate Based on Race 
In Loving v. Virginia, the Supreme Court struck down a state anti-
miscegenation statute.233  As previously noted, some media commentators 
viewed same-sex marriage, and thus Obergefell, as a natural extension of Lov-
ing.234  Anti-miscegenation laws criminalized the conduct of both parties to 
 
229 517 U.S. 456, 469–70 (1996). 
230 Id. at 469. 
231 481 U.S. 279, 291–92 (1987). 
232 Id. at 320 (Brennan, J., dissenting). 
233 388 U.S. 1, 2 (1967). 
234 See supra Introduction.  The Obergefell Court cited Loving for the discussion of marriage as a funda-
mental right, not for its suspect classification analysis.  Obergefell v. Hodges, 135 S. Ct. 2584, 
2599 (2015); see also Adam Liptak, A Steady Path to the Justices: Gay Marriage Cases Building Momentum, 
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an interracial marriage, and thus applied equally to the white and black 
spouses.235  The analytical difficulty, therefore, is that such statutes do not 
discriminate on the basis of race.  They instead discriminate along the sepa-
rate dimension distinguishing same-race (treated favorably) and mixed-race 
(treated unfavorably) couples.  Of course this does not make such laws be-
nign; they obviously are not, which is the point.  Historically discrimination 
correlated with presumptively bad laws, and conversely, non-discrimination 
correlated with presumptively good laws.  These intuitions are tested not 
only in the context of benign race-based laws, which discriminate favorably 
to blacks, but also in the context of anti-miscegenation laws, which discrim-
inate along a separate dimension but subordinate based on race. 
Writing in Loving for a unanimous Court, Chief Justice Warren struck 
down the law, which was obviously designed to harm blacks and other ra-
cial minorities by protecting, in effect, the white race from corruption of 
blood.  As Justice Stewart, who also joined the majority opinion, aptly ob-
served in a separate concurrence, it is sufficient to say that a law that crimi-
nalizes based on the race of the actors cannot stand.236  And this is true 
even if the law discriminated along a different dimension. 
Loving infuses anti-subordination as an independent principle into equal 
protection doctrine.  Setting aside benign racial preferences, laws that dis-
criminate based on race typically also subordinate based on race.  Loving 
demonstrates how a law can subordinate without discriminating, thus 
thwarting the conventional assumption that antidiscrimination and anti-
subordination operate in tandem.  The case helps to explain why when we 
combine the principles of antidiscrimination and anti-subordination in the 
context of race, we have a true dimensionality problem, whereas outside 
that context, these two principles coalesce thereby flattening dimensionali-
ty.  Consider Table 6 below. 
 
N.Y. TIMES, Feb. 15, 2014, at A1, A12 (connecting Loving and Obergefell prior to oral argument in 
Obergefell). 
235 The case facts were more complex.  The statute banned intermarriages between minorities and 
whites, but not between minorities.  Chief Justice Warren, writing for the majority, declared that 
feature irrelevant, holding the challenged law is patently unconstitutional “even assuming an 
even-handed state purpose to protect the ‘integrity’ of all races.”  Loving, 388 U.S. at 11–12 n.11 
(1967).  The text assesses the challenged law as characterized by the Loving Court. 
236 Loving, 388 U.S. at 13 (Stewart, J., concurring). 
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TABLE 6 
DISCRIMINATION, SUBORDINATION, AND DIMENSIONALITY 






Jim Crow Null Set 
Racial Subordina-
tion Not Condoned 
Modern Liberal Modern Conservative 
 
In Table 6, the two critical dimensions involve whether racial discrimi-
nation and racial subordination are or are not condoned.  The null set, or 
position no one would logically assume, is not condoning discrimination, 
but condoning subordination (upper right).  The Jim Crow position, upper 
left, condones both.  The modern liberal position condones affirmative ac-
tion, thus allowing benign discrimination, but does not condone subordina-
tion.  The modern conservative position, or color blindness, neither con-
dones racial discrimination nor subordination other than as the unintended 
consequence of laws promoting independent benign goals.  Although the 
Jim Crow and modern conservative positions resolve the two critical issues 
in opposite fashion, the modern liberal position does not split the difference 
along a single dimension.  Instead, the modern conservative and Jim Crow 
positions both oppose condoning the benign use of race, albeit for different 
reasons. 
Dimensionality flattens, however, when we eliminate discrimination 
consistently with Chief Justice Warren’s admittedly forced construction of 
the challenged statute.237  The normative attachment to color blindness no 
longer forces a separate dimension.  Instead, the binary split, condoning or 
not condoning racial subordination, rests along one dimension, shown in 
Table 7.  The Loving Court unanimously threw the subordinating anti-
miscegenation statute into the presumptively bad law bin, and struck it 
down, with the modern liberals and modern conservatives on the same side, 
opposing Jim Crow. 
 
237 See supra note 235.  For presentation purposes, this table is inverted relative to Table 6, with the 
vertical axis now cast horizontally. 
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TABLE 7  
LOVING IN ONE DIMENSION 
Conservative/Liberal Jim Crow 
Loving Result Anti-miscegenation Result 
Prohibit Subordination                                              Allow Subordination 
B.  Dimensionality and Gender 
The general absence of a sex-blindness equivalent to color blindness 
supports the intuition that gender cases are more likely to rest along a single 
analytical dimension.  Within our jurisprudential tradition, along with Lov-
ing, gender-based equal protection cases center on anti-subordination, not 
antidiscrimination. 
The challenge of gender-based classifications is that there are times 
when the sexes are situated differently in relevant ways and, as a result, 
when the analogy between race and sex breaks down.  To begin thinking 
about gender and dimensionality, reconsider Table 5, this time using gen-
der, not race, as informing the relevant categories. 
TABLE 8 
 GENDER AND DIMENSIONALITY 
 Benign Gender Classifications 
Permitted 
Benign Gender Classifications 
Prohibited  




Pre-Reed v. Reed restrictions 
on participation in bar, estate 
planning, and jury service 
Adverse Gender  
Classifications  
Not Permitted 
Modern Liberal View Sex-blindness? 
 
Prior to two landmark gender-distinction cases, the Court routinely sus-
tained laws distinguishing men and women based on then-dominant social 
mores concerning sex roles.  This began to change in Reed v. Reed,238 which 
struck down a ban on women administering estates, and in Frontiero v. Richard-
son,239 which struck down a presumption of family benefits for enlisted men 
but not women in the military.  Classic illustrations of earlier treatments in-
 
238 404 U.S. 71, 74 (1971). 
239 411 U.S. 677, 679 (1973). 
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cluded laws preventing women not married to the proprietor from bartend-
ing240 and rendering jury service voluntary for women but not men.241 
In Reed and Frontiero, both of which purported to apply rational basis 
scrutiny (of the “plus” or “with teeth” variety) while striking the challenged 
laws down, the Court began developing what we can now view as the mod-
ern liberal position.  That position no longer condones sex-based distinc-
tions premised on “overbroad generalizations” about the sexes.242  In Craig 
v. Boren,243 the non-intoxicating beer case, Justice Brennan articulated what 
has become known as “intermediate scrutiny.”  The test states:  “To with-
stand constitutional challenge, . . . classifications by gender must serve im-
portant governmental objectives and must be substantially related to 
achievement of those objectives.”244 
The intermediate tier returns us to the analysis of dimensionality.  As in 
Table 5, the lower right and upper left positions in Table 8 embrace seem-
ingly opposite views respecting the permissibility of challenged laws, this 
time harming or benefiting women.  But there is a critical difference.  In 
contrast with race, there isn’t a generally accepted sex-blind position within 
our jurisprudential tradition.245  Instead, the conservative and liberal posi-
tions on gender agree that sex-based distinctions can be drawn but disagree 
on the permissibility line. 
 
240 Goesaert v. Cleary, 335 U.S. 464, 465–66 (1948).  The Court had similarly rejected due process 
challenges to laws limiting the hours, or imposing minimum wages, for working women despite 
evidence that such laws undermined employment prospects for unskilled women as compared 
with similarly situated men.  See, e.g., Muller v. Oregon, 208 U.S. 412, 416–17, 423 (1908) (distin-
guishing Lochner v. New York, 198 U.S. 45 (1905), and sustaining state law setting ten-hour 
workday for women), overruled by Adkins v. Children’s Hospital, 261 U.S. 525, 552–53, 562 (1923) 
(relying on substantive due process to strike down minimum wage for women). 
241 Hoyt v. Florida, 368 U.S. 57, 60–61 (1961). 
242 United States v. Virginia, 518 U.S. 515, 533 (1996). 
243 429 U.S. 190 (1976).  For a more detailed discussion, see supra Part I.C.3. 
244 Craig, 429 U.S. at 197. 
245 Of course sex-blindness does exist as a theoretical position and also as policy in some settings.  
See, e.g., John Tagliabue, A School’s Big Lesson Begins with Dropping Personal Pronouns, N.Y. TIMES, 
Nov. 14, 2012, at A8 (discussing Egalia, a preschool in Stockholm, Sweden that eschews gen-
dered pronouns, “him” or “her,” in favor of “friend,” and that rejects any suppositions about sex 
roles). 
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TABLE 9 
 SEX-BASED EQUAL PROTECTION WITH FLATTENED DIMENSIONALITY 
Intermediate Scrutiny 
Rational Basis  
in Fact 
Intermediate Scrutiny  
as a Placeholder 
Strict Scrutiny  
in Fact 
Easy Cases to Sustain Hard Cases Easy Cases to Strike 
Down 
Benign Sex-Based Laws                                                  Adverse Sex-Based Laws 
 
When challenged laws draw lines based on gender, as in the prior ex-
amples, or are formally gender neutral but have gender-based effects, the 
analysis generally involves whether the challenged laws do or do not subor-
dinate women.246  Table 9 thus reveals the real purpose that intermediate 
scrutiny serves.  In the context of sex-based classifications, the easy cases 
occupy the opposite extremes along one dimension.  We know that simple 
exclusions or disadvantageous treatment of women based on antiquated no-
tions about the gender roles are easily struck down.  These cases are subject 
to intermediate scrutiny in name, and to strict scrutiny in fact.  Conversely, 
while there are few easily sustained sex-based distinctions, there are some.  
For a long time, separate bathrooms were viewed, perhaps wrongly in hind-
sight, as a trivial example.247  Others involve policies that recognize genuine 
sex differences, for example, who makes the final decision to terminate a 
pregnancy;248 same-sex rooming assignments in state institutions of higher 
 
246 See, e.g., Wengler v. Druggists Mut. Ins. Co., 446 U.S. 142, 146–47 (1980) (striking down a Mis-
souri workers’ compensation scheme specially requiring proof of dependency prior to widower, 
but not widow, receiving benefits); Califano v. Goldfarb, 430 U.S. 199, 202, 206–09 (1977) (rely-
ing on the anti-subordination principle to strike down federal program which afforded widows 
automatic benefits but conditioned widower benefits on proof of dependency).  In both cases, the 
difficulty was not gender discrimination.  Both the deceased woman paying contributions and the 
widower seeking benefits were harmed.  Rather, the discrimination favored traditional families by 
enacting a preference for husbands as primary breadwinners, in contrast with those in which the 
breadwinning responsibilities rested with the wife or were shared.  In that manner, these chal-
lenged laws violated the anti-subordination principle. 
247 Pending challenges by transgender individuals to gender-specific bathrooms appear to be chang-
ing this.  See generally Catherine Jean Archibald, Transgender Bathroom Rights, 24 DUKE J. GENDER 
L. & POL’Y 1 (2016); Catherine Jean Archibald, Transgender Student in Maine May Use Bathroom That 
Matches Gender Identity—Are Co-Ed Bathrooms Next?, 83 UMKC L. REV. 57 (2014); Rachel E. Mof-
fitt, Note, Keeping the John Open to Jane: How California’s Bathroom Bill Brings Transgender Rights out of the 
Water Closet, 16 GEO. J. GENDER & L. 475 (2015). 
248 See Planned Parenthood of Se. Pa. v. Casey, 505 U.S. 833, 894–96 (1992) (O’Connor, Kennedy, 
& Souter, JJ., joint opinion) (holding that a pregnant woman cannot be required to inform her 
husband of a planned abortion); see also Mary Ziegler, Abortion and the Constitutional Right (Not) to 
Procreate, 48 U. RICH. L. REV. 1263 (2014) (discussing history of spousal consent laws as part of 
larger inquiry into abortion rights framework and assisted reproductive technology). 
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learning, in the military, or in other venues where government provides 
housing to non-married persons; and as seen in Nguyen and Morales-Santana, 
whether to permit the government to prioritize based on the parent’s sex 
when a non-marital overseas-born offspring of only one U.S. citizen-parent 
later seeks citizenship.249 
Intermediate scrutiny might serve as a placeholder for difficult cases.  
And yet, line drawing difficulties, and even shifting lines over time, do not 
force problems of dimensionality.250  To illustrate, consider two much-
criticized sex-based equal protection cases.  In Geduldig v. Aiello, the Su-
preme Court held that the state did not violate equal protection in denying 
insurance benefits for pregnancy because the denial is not gender-based.251  
The second decision, Personnel Administrator of Massachusetts v. Feeney, involved 
a challenge to a program benefitting veterans in hiring, which, due to the 
history of military service, disproportionately benefitted men.252 
Although each challenged law was technically gender neutral, each also 
appears to have profound gender-based effects.  The Court sustained both 
policies, and the question is whether intermediate scrutiny is doing any 
work in reaching those results.  Geduldig appears problematic in that men 
obviously cannot become pregnant,253 and Feeney is disturbing because the 
history of military service affects men differently from women, thereby test-
ing gender neutrality. 
What makes these cases hard is not dimensionality.  It is instead the dif-
ficulty of line drawing.  Although the policies at issue in Geduldig and Feeney 
affect men and women differently, the effects are subtler than first appears.  
Consider pregnancy benefits.  Although only women become pregnant, on-
ly a relatively small number of women will do so during any given coverage 
period.  The beneficiaries of the pregnancy exclusion include persons 
whose contributions are reduced as a result of the exclusion, and that in-
cludes women who will not become pregnant.  Notably, however, it does 
not include all men.  For men whose wives are covered on their policies and 
become pregnant during the coverage period, the exclusion is also finan-
cially detrimental. 
 
249 For a discussion of Tuan Anh Nguyen v. INS, 533 U.S. 53 (2001), see supra Part I.C.3.  For a dis-
cussion of Sessions v. Morales-Santana, 137 S. Ct. 1678 (2017), and United States v. Flores-
Villar, 536 F.3d 990, 993 (9th Cir. 2008), see supra note 115. 
250 See supra Part II.A. 
251 417 U.S. 484, 496–97 (1974). 
252 442 U.S. 256, 281 (1979). 
253 Justice Ginsburg unsuccessfully argued for revisiting the Geduldig holding in Coleman v. Court of Ap-
peals of Maryland, maintaining that pregnancy discrimination “[b]y definition . . . discriminates on 
account of sex; for it is the capacity to become pregnant which primarily differentiates the female 
from the male.”  556 U.S. 30, 55 (2012) (Ginsburg, J., dissenting) (alteration in original) (quoting 
Gen. Elec. Co. v. Gilbert, 429 U.S. 125, 161–62 (1976) (Stevens, J., dissenting)).  Except for sea-
horses.  See JOAN ROUGHGARDEN, EVOLUTION’S RAINBOW: DIVERSITY, GENDER, AND 
SEXUALITY IN NATURE AND PEOPLE 45 (2004). 
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Feeney also appears problematic because we could say that wives of former 
military service members who benefit from the challenged policy do so along 
with their husbands, and husbands of women excluded from such positions 
due to the military benefit are burdened along with their wives.  Although the 
burdens and benefits are not gender specific, the challenged scheme reinforc-
es stereotypical notions about which spouse is responsible for providing hous-
ing and related benefits.  The point here is not to resolve these cases.  Rather, 
it is to show that the results are contestable because societal understanding of 
gender roles is evolving along the dimension of anti-subordination. 
C.  Dimensionality and Sexual Orientation: Obergefell Revisited 
Following Romer v. Evans,254 and Lawrence v. Texas,255 but before Obergefell v. 
Hodges,256 the Supreme Court took up two cases that implicated same-sex 
marriage.  In Hollingsworth v. Perry,257 which presented a challenge to California 
Proposition 108 banning same-sex marriage, Chief Justice Roberts denied the 
initiative sponsors standing to challenge the California Supreme Court ruling 
striking the initiative down.258  In dissent, Justice Kennedy argued in favor of 
standing, preferring to have the Court address the merits of the same-sex mar-
riage ban.259  In United States v. Windsor,260 issued the same day, Justice Kenne-
dy, writing for a majority, struck down Section 3 of DOMA, thereby invali-
dating federal laws that failed to recognize state-sanctioned same-sex 
marriage.261  The most compelling reading of the combined cases was that a 
majority comprising Justice Kennedy and the liberal wing of the Court sup-
ported striking down bans on same-sex marriage, but that some coalition 
members preferred to await a broader societal consensus.262  Subsequent legal 
developments appear to have vindicated that reading.263 
The harder prediction—the one that appears to have evaded most ob-
 
254 517 U.S. 620 (1996). 
255 539 U.S. 558; see also supra notes 83–94 and accompanying text (discussing the relationship be-
tween Romer, Lawrence, and Obergefell). 
256 135 S. Ct. 2584 (2015). 
257 133 S. Ct. 2652 (2013). 
258 Id. at 2659. 
259 Id. at 2668 (Kennedy, J., dissenting). 
260 133 S. Ct. 2675 (2013). 
261 Id. at 2683, 2695–96.  For a more detailed discussion of Windsor, see supra Part I.C.2. 
262 At least it seemed clear to this observer.  See Stearns, Grains of Sand, supra note 81, at 393–98 (pos-
iting that the liberal Justices Ginsburg, Breyer, and Kagan, who along with conservative Justice 
Scalia, joined Chief Justice Robert’s majority opinion denying standing in Hollingsworth, likely 
preferred to await further consensus in favor of same-sex marriage, and that Justice Kennedy, 
who dissented, would likely have struck down the same-sex marriage ban had the Court reached 
the merits). 
263 For a comprehensive account of the lower court case law at the time of the Obergefell decision, see 
Obergefell v. Hodges, 135 S. Ct. 2584 app. A (2015) (listing citations of state and federal judicial 
opinions on the issue of same-sex marriage). 
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servers—was the eventual basis for the ruling.  Commentators generally an-
ticipated three possible rationales, of which two seemed more likely.  Justice 
Kennedy chose a fourth.  The first option was to extend the animus analysis 
from Romer, striking the same-sex marriage ban without declaring gays and 
lesbians a suspect or quasi-suspect class.  The second option was to treat 
bans on same-sex marriage as a form of gender-based classification, thereby 
declaring sexual minorities a quasi-suspect class.  The third, somewhat less 
likely, rationale was to treat bans on same-sex marriage as analogous to an-
ti-miscegenation laws, thus declaring minority sexual orientation a suspect 
class.264  These approaches corresponded with a progression from rational 
basis (of the animus variety) to intermediate scrutiny (in its stricter form) to 
strict scrutiny (in its conventional, fatal form).  With the benefit of hindsight, 
it is easier to see why Justice Kennedy instead eschewed suspect classifica-
tion analysis, other than as the somewhat imprecise basis for an alternative 
holding, instead resting primarily on due process and finding same-sex 
marriage a fundamental right. 
The likely reason that commentators missed the mark on the eventual 
basis for the holding is that they were struggling for an approach that would 
minimize the probability of identifying minority sexual orientation as a 
quasi-suspect or suspect classification.  Viewed along the dimension of anti-
subordination, the clearest approach to resolving the case was to find that 
such laws were subject to strict scrutiny.  Either of the rejected alterna-
tives—the animus form of rational basis or stricter intermediate scrutiny—
would have accomplished that other than in name.  Indeed, this is why 
treating same-sex marriage bans as a variation on anti-miscegenation laws 
seemed implausible: such a ruling would have bluntly added minority sexu-
al status to the narrow grouping of suspect classifications.  And yet, Justice 
Kennedy managed to accomplish the same result of functionally applying 
strict scrutiny without formally declaring sexual minorities a suspect or even 
quasi-suspect class and without mentioning the applicable tier. 
Although Justice Kennedy nominally avoided tiers altogether, Chief 
Justice Roberts, writing the principal dissent, made plain that the majority 
opinion presumed strict scrutiny.265  Not surprisingly, Justice Kennedy of-
fered no refutation.  When the Court finds a fundamental right, laws that 
interfere with it must pass strict scrutiny to survive.  In effect, Justice Ken-
nedy managed to raise the tier of scrutiny to the highest level without hav-
ing to create a new suspect classification in doing so.  That stringent test 
 
264 See Loving v. Virginia, 388 U.S. 1, 11 (1967) (noting that racial classifications in criminal statutes 
were “especially suspect” in light of the Equal Protection Clause); see also supra note 235 and ac-
companying text. 
265 Obergefell, 135 S. Ct. at 2611 (Roberts, C.J., dissenting) (“And a State’s decision to maintain the 
meaning of marriage that has persisted in every culture throughout human history can hardly be 
called irrational.”). 
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will govern future challenges to such laws. 
Justice Kennedy’s approach also carried additional benefits.  The pri-
mary difficulty with animus analysis is that it would have resulted in casting 
aspersions on those opposing the extension of marriage to same-sex cou-
ples.  Such a ruling would have implied that those denying the extension of 
the right to marry to same-sex couples had exhibited an animus against 
gays and lesbians, a politically unpopular group.  For Justice Kennedy the 
difficulty harkened back to his opening remark at oral argument: whatever 
the merits of the policy question, many individuals long embraced a tradi-
tional view of marriage, one that he claimed had stood for millennia.266 
The fundamental rights analysis instead allowed Justice Kennedy to 
claim respect for the dignity both of same-sex couples, who were previously 
denied a right of access to marriage, and of those who held traditional views 
of marriage for religious or other reasons.  Even if critics, including the dis-
senting justices, questioned the sincerity of this position, the combination 
proved central to Justice Kennedy’s opinion. 
Consider this passage from the majority opinion: 
Finally, it must be emphasized that religions, and those who adhere to reli-
gious doctrines, may continue to advocate with utmost, sincere conviction that, 
by divine precepts, same-sex marriage should not be condoned.  The First 
Amendment ensures that religious organizations and persons are given proper 
protection as they seek to teach the principles that are so fulfilling and so central 
to their lives and faiths, and to their own deep aspirations to continue the family 
structure they have long revered.  The same is true of those who oppose same-
sex marriage for other reasons.  In turn, those who believe allowing same-sex 
marriage is proper or indeed essential, whether as a matter of religious convic-
tion or secular belief, may engage those who disagree with their view in an open 
and searching debate.  The Constitution, however, does not permit the State to 
bar same-sex couples from marriage on the same terms as accorded to couples 
of the opposite sex.267 
Perhaps the Court might have broadened the animus concept to in-
clude indifference to the harms imposed on politically unpopular groups, 
rather than hostility toward such groups.  Such a conceptual broadening 
might have allowed Kennedy to invalidate the same-sex marriage ban even 
if it persisted in spite of, rather than because of, its adverse effects to sexual 
minorities.  The difficulty, however, is that this approach would have 
broadened the narrow limits of the animus category of rationality review, 
making it hard to predict when laws enacted or retained for claimed be-
nign, but contested, reasons would be sustained.  By instead relying primar-
ily on due process, Justice Kennedy was able to thread the needle and to 
claim, at least formally, respect for the sincerely held views of those on both 
sides of this divisive issue. 
 
266 Transcript of Oral Argument at 6–7, Obergefell v. Hodges, 135 S. Ct. 2548 (2015) (No. 14-556). 
267 Obergefell, 135 S. Ct. at 2607. 
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Thus Justice Kennedy continued: 
The right to marry is fundamental as a matter of history and tradition, but 
rights come not from ancient sources alone.  They rise, too, from a better in-
formed understanding of how constitutional imperatives define a liberty that 
remains urgent in our own era.  Many who deem same-sex marriage to be 
wrong reach that conclusion based on decent and honorable religious or philo-
sophical premises, and neither they nor their beliefs are disparaged here.  But 
when that sincere, personal opposition becomes enacted law and public policy, 
the necessary consequence is to put the imprimatur of the State itself on an ex-
clusion that soon demeans or stigmatizes those whose own liberty is then de-
nied.  Under the Constitution, same-sex couples seek in marriage the same legal 
treatment as opposite-sex couples, and it would disparage their choices and di-
minish their personhood to deny them this right.268 
In effect, Justice Kennedy took the position that although we should respect 
those holding competing views of same-sex marriage, due process cannot 
condone both positions without undermining the fundamental rights of 
those who are burdened. 
To be sure, Chief Justice Roberts, writing in dissent, construed the ma-
jority ruling as condemning those opposed to same-sex marriage.269  Thus 
he stated: 
Perhaps the most discouraging aspect of today’s decision is the extent to 
which the majority feels compelled to sully those on the other side of the de-
bate.  The majority offers a cursory assurance that it does not intend to dispar-
age people who, as a matter of conscience, cannot accept same-sex marriage.  
That disclaimer is hard to square with the very next sentence, in which the ma-
jority explains that “the necessary consequence” of laws codifying the tradition-
al definition of marriage is to “demea[n] or stigmatiz[e]” same-sex couples.  
The majority reiterates such characterizations over and over.  By the majority’s 
account, Americans who did nothing more than follow the understanding of 
marriage that has existed for our entire history—in particular, the tens of mil-
 
268 Id. at 2602. 
269 More generally, the Chief Justice claimed that the majority decision fell within the tradition of 
the generally discredited decision, Lochner v. New York, 198 U.S. 45 (1905).  Obergefell, 135 S. 
Ct. at 2621 (Roberts, C.J., dissenting).  The Chief Justice didn’t disavow fundamental rights anal-
ysis altogether, but rather chastised the majority for its failure to abide the admonition to ground 
identified rights in history and tradition.  Id. at 2616, 2618, 2620–21 (arguing that by defining the 
right as marriage rather than same-sex marriage, the majority has effectively overruled Washing-
ton v. Glucksburg, 521 U.S. 702 (1997)); see also id. at 2640–41 (Alito, J., dissenting) (noting that 
the finding of a fundamental right to same-sex marriage is contrary to Glucksberg because it is not 
a right grounded in history and tradition).  The Supreme Court has made clear, however, that it 
does not overrule its own precedents by implication.  See Rodriguez de Quijas v. Shearson/Am. 
Express, Inc., 490 U.S. 477, 484 (1989) (“If a precedent of this Court has direct application in a 
case, yet appears to rest on reasons rejected in some other line of decisions, the Court of Appeals 
should follow the case which directly controls, leaving to this Court the prerogative of overruling 
its own decisions.”).  The different contexts of Glucksburg and Obergefell—the right to die and the 
right to same sex marriage—would readily allow a future Court to distinguish these holdings.  
The Chief Justice further argued that the claimed right could equally extend to plural marriage, 
although he also suggested that the two claims could be plausibly distinguished on other grounds.  
Obergefell, 135 S. Ct. at 2621–22 (Roberts, C.J., dissenting). 
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lions of people who voted to reaffirm their States’ enduring definition of mar-
riage—have acted to “lock . . . out,” “disparage,” “disrespect and subordinate,” 
and inflict “[d]ignitary wounds” upon their gay and lesbian neighbors.270 
Although the Court certainly took sides, Justice Kennedy’s due process 
analysis allowed him to claim respect for the views of those supporting or 
opposing same-sex marriage.  That feat would have been nearly impossible 
to accomplish based on a ruling resting on grounds of animus.  An animus 
ruling would also have required rejecting each proffered rationale for the 
limitation of marriage to opposite-sex couples.  This includes intuitions 
about traditional cultural mores and even possible opposite-sex comple-
mentariness in child rearing to the extent that those opposing the claimed 
right view marriage and child rearing as linked.271  The due process analysis 
appeared to avoid these difficulties, while at the same time elevating, in ef-
fect, the level of review to strict scrutiny. 
The most plausible alternative rationale would have equated equal pro-
tection analysis of sexual orientation and gender.  Despite its intuitive ap-
peal, treating a ban on same-sex marriage as an instance of gender discrim-
ination implicates an analytical puzzle.  The argument for this position is 
that restricting marriage to opposite-sex couples allows a woman to marry a 
man but disallows a man to marry a man, thus discriminating based on 
 
270 Obergefell, 135 S. Ct. at 2626 (Roberts, C.J., dissenting) (alteration in original) (citations omitted). 
271 Opposite sex complementarity implicates the much-contested literature on the possible biological 
bases, as opposed to strictly cultural bases, for brain-sex differences.  For literature supporting 
claims to a biological basis for such differences, see generally, for example, SIMON BARON-
COHEN, THE ESSENTIAL DIFFERENCE: THE TRUTH ABOUT THE MALE AND FEMALE BRAIN 
(2003) (associating different distributions of skills, based on gender, along the axes of empathy 
and systemization); Debra Soh, No, the Google Manifesto Isn’t Sexist or Anti-Diversity. It’s Science, THE 
GLOBE AND MAIL (Aug. 8, 2017), https://www.theglobeandmail.com/opinion/no-the-google-
manifesto-isnt-sexist-or-anti-diversity-its-science/article35903359/?service=amp (including links 
to relevant studies.).  For literature refuting such claims, or arguing that such claims are over-
blown as causal determinants for sex-based patterns of observed differences in behavior, see 
CORDELIA FINE, DELUSIONS OF GENDER: HOW OUR MINDS, SOCIETY, AND NEUROSEXISM 
CREATE DIFFERENCE (2010) (expounding a critique of the brain-sex dichotomy thesis); Dhruv 
Marwha et al., Meta-Analysis Reveals a Lack of Sexual Dimorphism in Human Amygdala Volume, 147 
NEUROIMAGE 282 (2017) (reviewing meta-analysis of fMRI studies).  Resolving this scientific de-
bate is well beyond the scope of this Article. 
   One related context in which such preferences are playing out is adoption proceedings. For 
illustrations of state laws favoring opposite-sex marriages in adoption proceedings, see, for exam-
ple, CONN. GEN. STAT. ANN. § 45a-726a (repealed 2013) (“[T]he Commissioner of Children and 
Families or a child-placing agency may consider the sexual orientation of the prospective adop-
tive or foster parent or parents when placing a child for adoption or in foster care.”); MISS. CODE 
ANN. § 93-17-3(5) (Supp. 2016) (“Adoptions by couples of the same gender is prohibited.”). In 
2011 the Catholic Church withdrew its adoption services from Illinois after determining its agen-
cies could no longer favor married couples. See Robin Fretwell Wilson, The Calculus of Accommoda-
tion: Contraception, Abortion, Same-Sex Marriage, and Other Clashes Between Religion and the State, 53 B.C. 
L. REV. 1417, 1447 (2012) (noting that many Catholic groups were “shedding their adoption ser-
vices” in response to the fact that they would not be exempted from a law that required them to 
consider same-sex couples). 
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gender.  The difficulty arises at the level of formal equality: the same re-
striction allows a man to marry a woman but disallows a woman to marry a 
woman.  So viewed, laws banning same-sex marriage are formally gender 
neutral inasmuch as they apply equally to both men and women.  Although 
avoiding the gender analogy directly, Justice Kennedy implicitly recognized 
the difficulty, thereby focusing instead on the subordinating effects of the 
law’s different treatment of same sex (disfavored) and opposite sex (favored) 
couples.272 
As seen most clearly in Loving, formal non-discrimination (or formal 
neutrality) does not resolve the ultimate question of constitutional permissi-
bility.  Instead it forces consideration of whether the restriction falls on the 
wrong side of the analytical dimension of anti-subordination.  The most 
straightforward equal protection analysis in Obergefell might have been to 
define minority sexual orientation as a suspect classification, thus applying 
strict scrutiny, and putting same-sex marriage bans into the presumptive 
bad law bin.  The Court was clearly reticent to add to the list of such classi-
fications, and so it accomplished this result through a ruling based on due 
process. 
Even so, Justice Kennedy linked the due process and equal protection 
rationales: 
The Due Process Clause and the Equal Protection Clause are connected in a 
profound way, though they set forth independent principles.  Rights implicit in 
liberty and rights secured by equal protection may rest on different precepts 
and are not always coextensive, yet in some instances each may be instructive 
as to the meaning and reach of the other.  In any particular case one Clause 
may be thought to capture the essence of the right in a more accurate and 
comprehensive way, even as the two Clauses may converge in the identification 
and definition of the right.  This interrelation of the two principles furthers our 
understanding of what freedom is and must become.273 
By focusing on the relationship between the two clauses, but resting 
primarily on due process, Justice Kennedy was able to offer a foundation in 
the equal protection doctrine that did not rest on finding minority sexual 
orientation a suspect or quasi-suspect class.  The dimension along which 
the Court effectively ruled was anti-subordination, but the Court nonethe-
less placed the ban on same-sex marriage on the offending side without 
formally entrenching the decision in the nuances of tiers analysis.  As this 
Article has shown, however, avoiding a discussion of tiers does not elimi-
 
272 See supra note 268 and accompanying text (reflecting Kennedy’s concern that bans on same-sex 
marriage “disparage their choices and diminish their personhood”).  For a related discussion in 
the context of employee benefits, see supra note 246 and accompanying text (striking down federal 
program affording widows automatic benefits, but conditioning widower benefits on proof of de-
pendency, and striking Missouri workers’ compensation scheme specially requiring proof of de-
pendency prior to widower, but not widow, receiving benefits). 
273 Obergefell, 135 S. Ct. at 2602–03 (citations omitted). 
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nate the functions that tiers serve.  The effect of Justice Kennedy’s Obergefell 
opinion is unambiguous: laws denying access to marriage by same-sex cou-
ples will now be subject to strict scrutiny. 
CONCLUSION 
The tiers of scrutiny doctrines have been widely condemned for produc-
ing dissatisfying results.  Commentators have found the doctrines muddled 
and their applications disingenuous.  This Article has offered a different 
way to think about the problem.  By focusing on the implications of dimen-
sionality for equal protection cases involving race, gender, and sexual orien-
tation, the analysis reveals the very limited circumstances in which a third 
tier is likely to prove helpful.  Removing clutter—rational basis plus (Cate-
gory 2) or strict scrutiny lite (Category 4)—is valuable not only for eliminat-
ing what is unnecessary, but also for providing a clearer focus on what re-
mains. 
The analysis provides the means for a more elegant system of tiers, one 
that avoids doctrinal contortions.  The analysis also helps to explain two 
important and contested equal protection doctrines, affirmative action and 
same-sex marriage.  Although recognizing the central role that dimension-
ality plays in tiers of scrutiny analysis will not eliminate the Red Queen 
Game, it might just allow lower courts to push ever so slightly ahead. 
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